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ARTICLES 
PENAL INCAPACITATION: A SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE 
Guyora Binder* & Ben Notterman** 
INTRODUCTION 
Objects or ends of penal justice . . .:  1st, Example—prevention of similar 
offences . . . by  the  repulsive infuence exercised on the minds of bystanders 
by the apprehension of similar suffering in case of similar delinquency. 2dly, 
Reformation—prevention of similar offences on the part of the particular 
individual punished . . . by  curing him of the will to do the like in future. 
3rdly, Incapacitation—prevention of similar offences on the part of the same 
individual, by depriving him of the power to do the like.1 
As we today look back at the infamous cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford2 and 
Plessy v. Ferguson3 to understand the ideologies of slavery and racial segregation, 
so too will later generations look to Ewing v. California4 to understand mass 
incarceration. In Ewing, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
sentence of twenty-fve years-to-life for stealing three golf clubs, under Califor-
nia’s infamous “Three Strikes and You’re Out” recidivist sentencing law.5 In 
holding this harsh sentence proportionate, the Court determined that sentences of 
imprisonment could be justifed by the goal of incapacitation alone, without 
requiring any empirical evidence that such sentences would in fact reduce crime. 6 
Instead, the Court simply assumed that locking up a prior offender would prevent 
crime that would otherwise occur.7 So, as we increased our incarcerated population 
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Jessica Su, and participants at a Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop for comments and suggestions. © 2016, Guyora 
Binder & Ben Notterman. 
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1. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon vs. New South Wales, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 173, 174 (John 
Bowring ed., 1843). 
2. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
4. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 25. 
7. See infra Part III (discussing the assumptions underlying incapacitation theory). 
1 
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700%,8 what were we thinking? The answer Ewing v. California suggests is that 
we thought we were incapacitating dangerous offenders.9 This Article argues that 
we were fundamentally mistaken. We were not incapacitating danger, but attribut-
ing it to individuals. We were not reducing the risk of crime, but redistributing it. 
In two recent cases, Graham v. Florida10 and Miller v. Alabama,11 the Supreme 
Court changed the landscape of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by requiring a 
more searching proportionality review of certain sentences of incarceration. 
Challenges to sentencing practices (as opposed to individual sentences) required a 
comparison of the severity of the authorized sentences to the gravity of the crimes 
punished.12 In making this comparison, the Court considered proportionality to all 
purposes of punishment cumulatively—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation.13 Moreover, it subjected incapacitation rationales to a test of 
empirical evidence.14 These decisions undermine the continued authority of Ewing 
and its uncritical acceptance of incapacitation as a justifcation for very long 
sentences. If such sentences cannot be shown to prevent crime, they may no longer 
satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. 
Incapacitation was frst identifed as a function of punishment by utilitarian 
philosopher and legal reformer Jeremy Bentham.15 For Bentham, public policy 
was best evaluated by its contribution to public utility, the maximum expected net 
aggregate pleasure of all members of society.16 From this utilitarian perspective, 
punishment was an evil, reducing utility by inficting suffering.17 It could be 
justifed only insofar as it prevented more suffering by preventing crime.18 
Accordingly, incapacitation justifes incarceration, only insofar as it reduces 
crimes overall, and at an acceptable social cost. If, as its critics claim, mass 
incarceration imposes unacceptable economic and social costs, it cannot fulfll the 
8. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE REVERSE MASS INCAR-
CERATION ACT 3 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fles/publications/The_Reverse_Mass_ 
Incarceration_Act%20.pdf (noting America’s prison population grew 700% since 1970). 
9. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (“[Ewing’s sentence] refects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, 
that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be 
incapacitated.”). 
10. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
11. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
12. See id. at 2463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 67–68. 
13. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72. 
14. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72. This Article focuses primarily on 
proportionality in the Court’s noncapital cases; incapacitation has effectively been removed from consideration as 
a penological justifcation for capital punishment, see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (fnding 
incapacitation “largely irrelevant” to analysis of state executions), though proportionality analysis itself is no 
longer easily divided into capital and non-capital settings. 
15. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF 
CRIME 19–21 (1995). 
16. Guyora Binder, Foundations of the Legislative Panopticon: Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 79, 79–83 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014). 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
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aim of incapacitation, which is to maximize utility. Although incapacitation is a 
possible function of punishment, incapacitation can also be pursued by other 
means. Thus, individuals can be restrained preventively, without their having 
committed any crime. Moreover, incapacitation need not be directed at particular 
individuals, let alone past offenders. Locks, surveillance cameras, and passwords 
are examples of incapacitation strategies directed generally at populations. These 
strategies make crime less likely by changing the situation confronting anyone 
who might otherwise commit it. Thus, penal incapacitation measures are a subset 
of incapacitation measures. The goal of incapacitation can only justify punishment 
insofar as restraining particular past offenders will prevent crimes that would 
otherwise occur, without causing greater harm than the crime prevented or any 
alternative means of preventing crime. 
This Article examines incapacitation as a justifcation for punishment. It focuses 
this inquiry through the prism of a generation of research in psychology on the 
relative importance of situation and character (or “disposition”) in accounting for 
behavior. It argues that incapacitation of past offenders is fundamentally fawed as 
a rationale for punishment. The problems with penal incapacitation are both 
conceptual and empirical. As a method of crime control, penal incapacitation is 
necessarily dispositionalist.19 It presupposes that past offenders are uniquely 
dangerous individuals who are destined to offend and re-offend regardless of 
social context. This assumption, however, must contend with empirical studies 
showing that situational forces frequently overwhelm individual disposition; the 
causes of crime are often dangerous situations rather than dangerous people.20 
With respect to welfare, there is thus little to be gained by incapacitating all 
offenders on the basis of their imagined predispositions to offend. What sustains 
the illusion that penal incapacitation is welfare-enhancing is the Fundamental 
Attribution Error, a pervasive cognitive bias that causes humans to underestimate 
the power of situational factors and overemphasize disposition or personality.21 
We will acknowledge that there may be a much smaller population of offenders 
with discernible dispositions to offend (most of whom would probably be 
incarcerated even in a penal regime aimed at goals other than incapacitation). Thus 
incapacitation may justify some incarceration, but not mass incarceration. 
Penal incapacitation rests on an understanding of behavior that is deeply 
inconsistent. Its proponents view offenders as inherently dangerous and likely to 
reoffend regardless of where they are put. Yet it also presumes that offenders will 
not continue to offend once they are incarcerated. A possible rejoinder is that an 
incapacitationist criminal justice system need not prevent crime in prison. The 
diffculty with this solution is that it abandons an essential feature of incapacita-
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra notes 233–55 and accompanying text. 
21. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, 10  
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 184–87 (1977). 
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tion: its utilitarianism. From a utilitarian perspective, the welfare of all persons 
counts equally, including that of offenders. There is no purpose served by 
imposing suffering on an offender merely to shift additional suffering from one 
victim to another. If the purpose of incapacitation is not to reduce crime but to 
redistribute it to the guilty, it abandons its claim to advance the public welfare. 
Thus conceived, incapacitation is not a distinct rationale for punishment at all, but 
instead is a means to retribution. Yet a retributive strategy of redistributing crime to 
past offenders must embrace the unpalatable assumption that offenders deserve not 
just their prescribed punishment, but also an increased risk of criminal victimiza-
tion. Moreover, retribution cannot justify sentences like Ewing’s that seem 
undeserved. If our current strategy of penal incapacitation serves neither utility nor 
desert, it is tempting to interpret it critically, as an ideological practice that 
disguises normative judgments (of blame) as facts (about risk). We will argue that 
our current practice of penal incapacitation is best understood as a segregation 
regime, which both prevents offenders from associating with other members of 
society, and stigmatizes them as unworthy to do so. Given our country’s history of 
racial segregation and the disproportionately minority composition of the inmate 
population, such segregation is not an acceptable use of the criminal justice 
system.22 
Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I describes the belated emergence of 
incapacitation as the dominant aim of criminal justice, and the modern incapacita-
tion strategies that have contributed to mass incarceration. These incapacitation 
strategies have included reduced probation and parole, recidivist statutes, and 
possession offenses. Part II summarizes the place of incapacitation in the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality review of noncapital sentencing deci-
sions, and reviews the theoretical premises and empirical assumptions of penal 
incapacitation. It includes a critical discussion of the methods available to identify 
which individuals are disposed to offend in the future. Part III discusses psycholo-
gy’s attribution theory and offers a situationist critique of penal incapacitation and 
its dispositionalist assumptions. It also describes attribution errors and suggests 
that the plausibility of incapacitation theory rests on such errors. Part IV offers a 
critical reinterpretation of incapacitation as an expressive practice of segregating 
and stigmatizing offenders. Part V considers the signifcance of these criticisms of 
incapacitation for its place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It argues that after 
Graham and Miller, the weak theoretical and empirical basis for believing that 
mass incarceration can incapacitate should preclude incapacitation from justifying 
life terms and other severe sentence enhancements. A brief conclusion summarizes 
the argument. 
22. See infra Section IV.E. 
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I. MODERN INCAPACITATION STRATEGIES 
A. The Rise of Incapacitation 
Although Bentham identifed “Incapacitation” as one way that punishment 
might prevent crime, he considered it far less important than general deterrence, 
which could infuence many more potential offenders.23 He identifed incapacita-
tion with transportation, which he mocked as less a means of preventing crime than 
of removing it from one place to another.24 
Among the early Americans who pioneered the penitentiary, rehabilitation 
(“Reform” in Bentham’s terminology) was the primary aim of this new method of 
punishment.25 Rehabilitation continued to dominate American penology until the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, when support for it suddenly collapsed.26 
Throughout this period, incapacitation was seen as a marginal function of punish-
ment, useful only for a small population of incorrigibly dangerous offenders.27 In 
the 1960s and 1970s, however, as crime rates rose, rehabilitation came under 
attack as paternalistic, arbitrary, potentially discriminatory, and—most devastat-
ingly—ineffectual.28 A study of prison rehabilitative programs entitled “What 
Works?” famously concluded that none did.29 Because incapacitation had long 
been seen as the default strategy when rehabilitation failed, it flled the void and 
became “dominant by default.”30 Liberals continued to insist that incapacitation 
was necessary only for a small group of incorrigibly dangerous offenders. In this 
sense, they proposed a strategy of selective incapacitation. Yet they offered no 
method for selecting these few, and their track record of excessive optimism about 
rehabilitative programs seemed to discredit their optimism about offenders them-
selves.31 In an atmosphere of anxiety about rising crime, the public could easily 
confate the failure of rehabilitative programs to affect recidivism rates with the 
inevitable recidivism of all offenders. As Zimring and Hawkins commented: 
The case for incapacitation at the individual level . . .  rest[s] on the premise 
that the individual who has offended once will offend again unless restrained. 
23. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 174. 
24. Id. at 184. 
25. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 79–108 (1971); Edward L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 LAW & INEQ. 343, 347–52 
(2001). 
26. Rubin, supra note 25, at 347; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 6–10; Francis A. Allen, The Decline of 
the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (1978); Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some 
Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
27. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 21–25. 
28. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 33–34 
(1981). 
29. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974). 
30. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 3–17. 
31. Id. at 10–12. 
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The implicit assumption that offenders are intractable and insusceptible to 
change serves to justify imprisonment for the purpose of restraint on both 
moral and practical grounds. Indeed an image of the criminal offender as 
intractable was very much in fashion by the 1990[]s.32 
This prevalent image of the intractable offender was infected with racial connota-
tions. Rising crime rates coincided with urban riots and disputes over school 
desegregation during the 1960s and 1970s to make crime policy a context for racial 
demagoguery. Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan made coded 
appeals to White resentment by identifying themselves with “law and order” or 
referring to city streets as dangerous “jungles.”33 Anti-crime rhetoric also attacked 
judges as indifferent to crime victims. The Supreme Court, already under attack for 
mandating school desegregation, made itself a target of anti-crime rhetoric by 
expanding constitutional safeguards in criminal procedure and restricting the death 
penalty.34 Critiques of judicial discretion motivated calls for uniform, determinate 
sentencing, culminating in the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines and guideline 
schemes in about half the states.35 Parole and probation were increasingly 
portrayed as a revolving door, releasing incorrigibly violent offenders to prey on 
the public. The 1988 presidential campaign revealed the political potency of this 
narrative, as ads for George Bush held Michael Dukakis responsible for a violent 
crime committed by a furloughed black prisoner named Willie Horton and showed 
prisoners exiting a revolving door.36 California’s 1994 “Three Strikes” law was 
propelled by public outrage over another violent crime by a parolee.37 
Proponents of incapacitation recognized the public’s taste for higher incarcera-
tion rates in the 1970s. James Q. Wilson presciently observed, “Since society 
clearly wishes its criminal laws more effectively enforced . . .  this means rising 
prison populations perhaps for a long period . . . .”38 Wilson therefore proposed a 
strategy of collective incapacitation—confning all offenders. He speculated—in 
32. Id. at 15. 
33. WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 234, 236–39 (2011); JONATHAN SIMON, 
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 50 (2007). 
34. See, e.g., Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exercising The Exclusionary Demons: An Essay on Rhetoric, 
Principle, and the Exclusion Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 60–61 (1984); SIMON, supra note 33, at 60–62, 113–26. 
35. See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 9–10; Kevin Reitz, Sentencing: Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
& JUSTICE 1429, 1429–40 (2002); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND 
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). 
36. Beth Schwartzappel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited#.Mx6RZ5aqD. 
37. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES 
AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4–7 (2001) (discussing role of murder of Polly Klaas by parolee Richard Davis in 
referendum campaign for this law); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14–15 (2003) (discussing infuence of Polly 
Klaas case). 
38. Farnsworth Fowle, Study Shows Prison Population Rose 13% in 1976 to Set a Record, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
18, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/1977/02/18/archives/study-shows-prison-population-rose-13-in-1976-to-set-
a-record.html (quoting James Q. Wilson). 
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advance of empirical evidence—that substantial reductions in crime would fol-
low.39 He presented the prospect of these benefts as a matter of common sense, to 
be presumed absent contrary evidence: 
When criminals are deprived of their liberty, as by imprisonment . . .  their 
ability to commit offenses against citizens is ended . . . .  
. . .  
. . . [T]here is one great advantage to incapacitation as a crime control 
strategy—namely it does not require us to make any assumptions about human 
nature. By contrast, deterrence works only if people take into account the costs 
and benefts of alternative courses of action . . . .  Rehabilitation works only if 
the values, preferences, or time-horizons of criminals can be altered by 
plan . . . .  
Incapacitation, on the other hand, works by defnition: its effects result from 
the physical restraint placed upon the offender and not from his subjective 
state. More accurately, it works provided at least three conditions are met: 
some offenders must be repeaters, offenders taken off the streets must not be 
immediately and completely replaced by new recruits, and prison must not 
increase the post-release criminal activity of those who have been incarcerated 
suffciently to offset the crimes prevented by their stay in prison. 
The frst condition is surely true . . . .  [T]he great majority of persons in 
prisons are repeat offenders, and thus prison, whatever else it may do, protects 
society from the offenses those persons would commit if they were free. 
The second condition . . .  seems plausible . . .  except, perhaps, for certain 
crimes (such as narcotics traffcking or prostitution), which are organized 
along business lines. For . . .  predatory street crimes—robbery, burglary, auto 
theft, larceny—there are no barriers to entry and no scarcity of criminal 
opportunities . . . .  
. . . In  general, there is no evidence that the prison experience makes 
offenders as a whole more criminal . . . .40 
By setting the bar for success very low in this passage—any net crime prevention— 
Wilson was able to argue that unlike rehabilitation, incapacitation was guaranteed 
to work. The only pertinent question empirical investigation could answer was 
how much. The U.S. Supreme Court essentially accepted that logic of common 
sense in Ewing v. California, in deferring to the California Legislature’s “judgment 
that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who already 
have been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime[,]” without requiring 
that this judgment be supported by empirical evidence.41 The haphazard way in 
which this legislation was drafted belies any notion that the legislature tailored it to 
39. James Q. Wilson, If Every Criminal Knew He Would be Punished if Caught . . .,  N.Y.  TIMES MAG. (Jan. 28, 
1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/28/archives/if-every-criminal-knew-he-would-be-punished-if-caught-
but-he-doesnt.html. 
40. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145–47 (2d rev. ed.1983) (citation omitted). 
41. Ewing, 538 U.S at 29–30. 
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empirical fndings.42 
Yet even if we accepted that confnement prevented crime by defnition, it would 
still be a particularly costly way of doing so, in also preventing all useful activity 
by its targets, while maintaining them at public expense.43 If incapacitation is 
conceived in utilitarian terms as a strategy for maximizing the social welfare, 
incapacitation only succeeds if it costs less than the crime it prevents and all 
alternative means of preventing that crime. The high cost of collective incapacita-
tion made the scale of expected prevention matter. While an infuential paper 
claimed that imposing a fve-year sentence for every violent offense would reduce 
violent crime by 80%,44 later analyses predicted that fve-year mandatory sen-
tences for felonies would reduce felonies by at most 15%—less if the highest-rate 
offenders could expect to fnd themselves back in prison within fve years 
45anyway. 
Criminologists responded to the high cost and modest beneft of collective 
incapacitation by trying to make incapacitation more selective. Interviews with 
inmates revealed that a high percentage of their crimes had been committed by a 
small number of high-rate offenders. It seemed that if these high-rate offenders 
could be identifed and selectively confned, incapacitation would be achieved at 
less cost. Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse developed a list of biographical 
factors—essentially past offending, incarceration, drug use, and unemployment— 
that seemed to predict high-rate offending.46 Yet subsequent re-analyses dimin-
ished the predictive power of these factors. Moreover, critics pointed to four 
mechanisms likely to further reduce the preventive effcacy of selecting offenders 
for incapacitation. First, because rules of complicity inculpate multiple offenders 
in group crimes, participants in criminal groups tend to be liable for many crimes. 
In this sense, they may be high-rate offenders. Yet group offenses will not 
generally be prevented by the removal of one member. The number of persons 
liable for the offense may decrease (unless another participant is recruited) but the 
harm inficted may not. Second, non-prisoners with the predictive factors were 
unlikely to offend at the rates of prisoners, since high-rate offending increases the 
odds of arrest and imprisonment. Third, for this method of prediction to be applied, 
some of the predictive data has to be gathered from offenders, who have no 
42. Determined to prevent the Republican Governor from using a recidivist sentencing statute as an election 
issue, the Democratic leadership of the legislature committed to pass whatever the Governor proposed. The 
Governor proposed language previously offered as a popular initiative. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra 
note 37, at 3–7. 
43. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT 
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9 (2012) (fnding that average per prisoner cost of incarceration in forty states 
studied in 2010 was $31,286). 
44. Shlomo Shinnar & Reuel Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A 
Quantitative Approach, 9 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 581 (1975). 
45. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 27 (1983). 
46. PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, RAND CORP., SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982). 
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incentive to supply it. Fourth, in practice, law enforcement personnel are likely to 
deploy discretion to resist differential punishments of offenders committing 
similar offenses.47 
These obstacles to selective incapacitation might have convinced researchers 
that incapacitation could not achieve cost-effective prevention. Instead, propo-
nents argued that collective incapacitation would automatically select high-rate 
offenders through “stochastic selection,” as higher rate offenders would be more 
likely to be arrested and convicted.48 Yet stochastic selection can disproportion-
ately confne high-rate offenders and still confne many more low-rate offenders. 
Moreover, the stochastic selection hypothesis presumes that those who have 
offended at a high rate in the past will offend at a high rate in the future, without 
offering any causal account of offending that could justify that presumption. In 
place of a causal theory, it simply assumes that offense rates are traits of 
individuals, dispositions that persist, regardless of environment.49 
Both selection based on predictive instruments and stochastic selection depend 
on this attribution of past offenses to persistent dispositions. As such, both are 
equally vulnerable to the group criminality objection, which suggests that high-
rate offending may depend on environmental rather than dispositional factors. 
Evidence indicates that co-offending is high for the offenses of robbery and 
burglary—precisely the offenses Wilson assumed would not be subject to a 
replacement effect.50 Both prediction and stochastic selection are similarly vulner-
able to the argument that by the time offenders are confned, their remaining 
criminal careers may be shorter than their sentences. One study found an average 
career-length for violent crime of less than ten years.51 
Despite the high cost of collective incapacitation and the empirical challenges 
facing selective incapacitation, American policymakers pursued incapacitation 
enthusiastically. The ensuing sections describe several incapacitative practices that 
emerged during the late twentieth century and that continue today: the reduction of 
probation and parole; recidivist sentencing enhancements; the increased investiga-
tion, prosecution, and punishment of possession offenses; and lengthening prison 
terms. Common to these incapacitative practices is an underlying assumption that 
offenders offend because of an inherent disposition to do so. 
47. See 1 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 134–35 (Alfred Blumstein, 
Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey A. Roth & Christy Visher, eds., 1986). 
48. Alex R. Piquero & Alfred Blumstein, Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime?, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOL-
OGY 267, 272–74 (2007); José Canela-Cacho et al., Relationship between the Offending Frequency () of  
Imprisoned and Free Offenders, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 133, 133–76 (1997). 
49. Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 117  
(2012) (“[S]elective incapacitation requires a prospective threat-based approach to sentencing and, in so doing, 
treats us as unwavering sources of risk rather than as persons capable of responding to reasons.”). 
50. Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 48, at 272–74. 
51. Id. 
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B. Disappearance of Probation and Parole 
 and probation arose early in the twentieth century as mechanisms 
52 
Parole to 
rehabilitate offenders. Unlike incapacitation, rehabilitation presupposes that 
people have the capacity to change. The primary focus of parole programs through 
the 1960s was to facilitate reentry by providing employment and housing-related 
services.53 The percentage of prisoners released on parole exceeded 70% in 
1977.54 As crime-control rhetoric infused American politics in the 1980s and 
1990s, parole and probation gave way to determinate sentencing.55 Some states 
abolished parole entirely, and many others severely limited its use.56 By 1997, only 
28% percent of prisoners were paroled.57 
As public attitude and the political climate changed, parole and probation 
services began devoting more resources to surveillance and control of parolees.58 
No longer avenues toward reintegration, these institutions redirected offenders 
back into prison by placing new conditions on offenders, such as curfew and drug 
tests.59 The professional orientation of parole offcers shifted, as new recruits 
increasingly had training in criminal justice rather than social work.60 Unsurpris-
ingly, parole violations increased drastically: the percentage of state parolees 
successfully completing supervision fell from 70% in 1984 to 44% in 1996.61 Now 
aided by the use of GPS and DNA technology, revocations continue to be a major 
source of recidivism throughout the country.62 
C. Recidivist Sentence Enhancements 
Recidivist sentencing laws enhance punishment for reoffenders. A well-
publicized example is California’s “three-strikes” law. Under that law, offenders 
previously convicted of two or more “serious” or “violent” crimes could be 
sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for an additional felony.63 The law produced 
52. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479 (1999). 
53. Id. at 502. 
54. Id. at 489. 
55. A determinate sentence is one whose length is fxed by the sentencing body/judicial offcer at the time of 
sentencing. Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 377, 382–85 (2005). 
56. Petersilia, supra note 52, at 494–95 (noting that fourteen states had abolished parole by 1998). 
57. Id. at 489. 
58. Id. at 507–08. 
59. See id. at 507–08. 
60. Id. at 508. 
61. Id. at 512–13. 
62. Id. at 483 (explaining that parole revocation symbolizes the “lock ‘em up and throw away the key 
attitudes”). 
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(a) (West 2016). Since 2012, the third strike must also be a “serious” or 
“violent” felony. See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, THE AMENDMENT OF THE THREE STRIKES 
SENTENCING LAW 5 (2016), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Three-Strikes-Amendment-Couzens-Bigelow. 
pdf. 
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some very harsh sentences, including that in Ewing.64 California’s three-strikes 
law was by no means unusual. As recounted by the majority in Ewing, “between 
1993 and 1995, three-strikes laws effected a sea change in criminal sentencing 
throughout the Nation,”65 refecting “a deliberate policy choice” that repeat 
offenders “must be isolated from society in order to protect the public safety.”66 
Like parole reduction, recidivist statutes were proposed in response to “outcry 
against repeat offenders” and “disaffection with the rehabilitative model.”67 
Statistical analyses suggest California’s Three Strikes law did not make the 
public appreciably safer.68 One reason may be that a large majority of offenders to 
whom the statute has been applied were incarcerated for non-violent crimes.69 
Another explanation is that three-strikes sentencing provisions are often applied to 
offenders who are nearing an age at which criminal behavior tends to drop off 
precipitously.70 As a result, many such offenders are incarcerated just as incarcera-
tion begins to serve no public safety purpose.71 Recidivist statutes may also be 
counterproductive insofar as incarceration increases the probability that an indi-
vidual commits additional crimes after release.72 Incarceration can sever social 
and familial connections, impede the pursuit of education, compromise job 
prospects, and expose offenders to criminal networks. The experience of prison 
appears to cause some prisoners to develop responses necessary for survival inside 
prisons but that disserve them on the outside.73 
Where the decline of probation and parole show the repudiation of rehabilitation 
as an aim of punishment, recidivist sentencing enhancements more clearly show 
the embrace of a strategy of identifying and incapacitating the dangerous. 
D. Possession Offenses 
Incapacitation is not limited to the back end of our criminal justice system. 
Incapacitative justice also relies on law enforcement to predict dangerous conduct 
64. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
65. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
66. Id. 
67. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63, 80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Although the State alludes in passing to retribution or deter-
rence . . . its  only serious justifcation for the 25-year minimum treats the sentence as a way to incapacitate a given 
defendant from further crime . . .  .”). 
68. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 37, at 85–105 (noting crime dropped signifcantly after 1994, 
but there was no evidence that the three strikes law contributed by means of either incapacitation or deterrence); 
EHLERS ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., STILL STRIKING OUT: TEN YEARS OF CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES, 12–19 
(2004) infra note 122. 
69. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 68, at 8 (“[N]early two thirds . . . of  second or third strikers were serving 
time for a nonviolent offense.”). 
70. Robinson, infra note 82, at 1451. 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects on Families 
and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73, 76 (2014). 
73. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049 (2008). 
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and identify its perpetrators before it occurs. As detailed in a pivotal article by 
Markus Dubber, crimes of drug and gun possession became enormously popular 
tools for “identifcation and neutralization” of potential offenders during the war 
on crime.74 
The number and variety of possession offenses are striking. In 1998, there were 
156 possession offenses proscribed in New York, including 115 felonies.75 
Possession charges accounted for 18% of arrests throughout the state in 1998, and 
one-third of those ultimately sentenced to jail or prisons.76 Possession can carry 
harsh penalties—eleven in New York were punishable by terms of life.77 The 
Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan upheld the life sentence given to a 
frst-time offender convicted of cocaine possession.78 Possession is frequently 
charged along with other offenses in order “to increase the incapacitative potential 
of a given conviction.”79 
Since contraband rarely causes harm independent of any additional use, posses-
sion offenses are essentially inchoate, designed to identify persons likely to cause 
harm and to enable police to interfere before harm occurs. Possession offenses 
arguably stretch basic principles of criminal law in order to broaden the dragnet of 
incapacitation and ease the path to prosecution.80 Thus, the law of possession 
elevates “instrumentalities of crime” to crime itself81 in order to criminalize those 
it suspects are likely to become criminals. It evades limits on attempt liability, by 
requiring no “substantial step” towards causing harm.82 Possession crimes attenu-
ate the requirement of culpability because knowledge of possession is often 
presumed.83 Possession crimes attenuate the requirement of an act by ascribing 
“constructive possession” to suspects in the vicinity of contraband.84 
The Supreme Court has reshaped criminal procedure to facilitate the search for 
contraband and the law of possession. Terry v. Ohio enabled offcers to stop, 
question, and search suspects on the basis of reasonable suspicion of imminent 
crime.85 The fact that reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk can be 
74. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L.  
& CRIMINOLOGY 829, 856 (2001) (describing possession “as the most convenient gateway into the criminal justice 
system”). 
75. See id. at 859. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
79. Dubber, supra note 74, at 901. 
80. See id. at 873 (“Given the fexibility of its conception and the convenience of its enforcement, possession 
offenses alone can quickly and easily incapacitate large numbers of undesirables for long periods of time.”). 
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2016) (proscribing the possession, brandishing, or discharging of frearms). 
82. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 907–08; Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventa-
tive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1448 n. 71 (2001). 
83. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 864–65; State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 415 (Fla. 2012). 
84. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25(a) (McKinney 2016); United States v. Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 6–7 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
85. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 835. 
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established by such diffuse indices of guilt as fight from police in a high crime 
area86 shows that reasonable suspicion need not be of any particular crime. Once 
stopped, a suspect can be asked to identify himself, enabling a check for 
outstanding arrest warrants.87 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte held that one need not be 
informed of one’s right to refuse a police search for contraband in the absence of 
probable cause.88 These and many other holdings allow police to investigate 
citizens who are not actively causing harm, for evidence of dangerous propensi-
ties. Even if a stop exposes neither contraband nor an outstanding warrant, it can 
still lead to an arrest for disorderly conduct, obstruction of governmental adminis-
tration, or even assault. In all these ways the search for contraband became central 
to a strategy of identifying and arresting dangerous persons. 
The fact that presence in a high crime area and fight from police can justify 
stops as reasonable suggests that suspected dangerousness can serve as a proxy for 
race. Studies have indeed shown that African Americans are more likely than 
Whites to be stopped on foot89 and in cars,90 more likely to be searched if 
stopped,91 and more likely to be arrested,92 particularly for drug offenses.93 
E. Increasing Length of Prison Sentences 
As currently practiced, penal incapacitation separates offenders from society 
“for as long as possible.”94 Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 to require longer, more determinate criminal sentencing and eliminate 
parole for federal prisoners.95 The Act’s “truth in sentencing” component— 
responding to frustration with judicial sentencing discretion—mandated that 
federal prisoners serve at least 85% of their sentences.96 Ten years later, Congress 
offered fnancial incentives for states to follow suit with their own truth in 
86. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
87. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S 177 (2004). 
88. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973). 
89. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” 
Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007). 
90. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 8–10 
(2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00041.pdf [http://perma.cc/CCK2-GKQH]. 
91. Traffc Stops, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tytp&tid702 (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2016). 
92. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL: 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2009), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/ 
default/fles/publication_pdf/created-equal.pdf. 
93. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 261, 
269–74 (2009); Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery 
Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 106 (2006). 
94. Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 187 (2010). 
95. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codifed as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2016). 
14 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
sentencing statutes, which most did.97 Meanwhile, states developed a variety of 
sentence-enhancing statutes, including not only three-strikes statutes, but also 
mandatory minimums, stricter drug penalties, and the expanded use of life without 
parole sentences. To what end? Studies have found no clear incapacitative effect of 
these longer sentences on public safety,98 while minority offenders, particularly 
African Americans, have borne the brunt of longer sentences.99 
In state systems, time served increased substantially across all crime categories 
between 1990 and 2009—37% for violent crimes, 36% for drug crimes, and 24% 
for property crimes—although sentence length varied substantially across states.100 
These increases were the result of sentence enhancement legislation as well as 
decreasing use of probation and parole.101 Federal sentencing exhibited a similar 
overall trend: average time served more than doubled between 1988 and 2012, and 
increased across all categories of crime.102 The increase was caused in large part 
by mandatory minimum sentencing, the federal “truth in sentencing” policy,103 
and the number of inmates serving life without parole—which grew from 12,453 
in 1992 to 41,000 in 2008.104 
This unprecedented lengthening of prison sentences cannot be justifed by 
penological purposes other than incapacitation.105 Although incarceration undoubt-
edly has a deterrent effect,106 there is little evidence that lengthening prison 
97. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); see 
ELSA CHEN, IMPACTS OF THREE STRIKES AND TRUTH IN SENTENCING ON THE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION OF 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 19 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffles1/nij/grants/187109.pdf; William Pizzi, 
Understanding the United States’ Incarceration Rate, 95 JUDICATURE 207, 207–08 (2012) (discussing New York’s 
“Jenna’s Law”). 
98. See CHEN, supra note 97, at 34; Richard L. Lippke, Crime Reduction and the Length of Prison Sentences, 
24 L. & POL’Y 17, 22 (2002); Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 82. 
99. Joshua B. Fischman and Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 729 (2012). 
100. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/legacy/uploadedfles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/ 
prisontimeservedpdf.pdf. 
101. Id. at 7. Although much of the increase in time served was achieved through determinate sentencing 
reforms rather than longer maximums, that does not mean that sentence length was not an independently 
important goal of sentencing reform. Care could have been taken to lower maxima while pushing minima up, so 
as to make determinacy neutral as to time served. But as Wilson observed, there was a clear perception that the 
public wanted more punishment. See FOWLE, supra note 38. 
102. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST., PRISON TIME SURGES FOR FEDERAL INMATES 2 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts. 
org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates. 
103. See id. at 4. 
104. Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 308 (2011). 
105. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 82 (“It is fair to say that none of these policies were grounded in 
research-based evidence that connected their enactment to reducing crime or producing any positive criminal 
justice outcome.”). 
106. RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 9 (2009) (explaining collapse of law enforcement causes homicide 
rates to skyrocket). 
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sentences increases this deterrent effect.107 Some studies even report that longer 
sentences may actually exacerbate recidivism.108 
Nor do rehabilitation or retribution provide a satisfactory explanation for 
increasingly punitive sentencing. As to the former, most prison systems are bereft 
of educational and workplace training.109 Life sentences serve no rehabilitative 
purpose,110 and it was the rejection of rehabilitation that led policymakers to 
embrace incapacitation.111 If anything, data suggests that longer sentences stimu-
late antisocial tendencies by disconnecting prisoners from their families, stirring 
individual and community-wide resentment, exposing non-violent offenders to the 
criminogenic infuence of more hardened offenders, and over-crowding prisons to 
a degree that increases aggression.112 
As for the goal of retribution, sentence-enhancing practices generate outcomes 
that seem out of line with just deserts.113 The Supreme Court’s docket in recent 
years offers striking examples: ffty years to life for stealing videotapes worth 
$200;114 forty years for possessing nine ounces of marijuana;115 life imprisonment 
for obtaining $121 by false pretenses;116 and life, without parole, for possession of 
107. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null 
Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 143 (2003); VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 5 (2010), http://www.sentencingproject. 
org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefng%20.pdf (citing David Farrington, Paul Langan & Per-Olof H. Wikstrom, 
Changes in Crime and Punishment in America, England and Sweden between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 STUD. IN 
CRIME PREVENTION, 104 (1994)). 
108. See WRIGHT, supra note 107, at 6; Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 76. 
109. See, e.g., Gregory A. Knott, Cost and Punishment: Reassessing Incarceration Costs and the Value of 
College-in-Prison Programs, 32 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 267, 281–82 (2012) (discussing the defunding of prison 
education in the 1990s); Editorial, A College Education for Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/02/16/opinion/a-college-education-for-prisoners.html?_r1. 
110. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (“Life without parole ‘forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.’”). 
111. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(1990); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15. 
112. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 87–89 (“Paradoxically, longer federal sentences have also 
resulted in a staggering increase in recidivism.”). 
113. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that if a sentence of ffty 
years-to-life for stealing videotapes worth $200 “is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning”); 
Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 75 (calling for legislation to “transform our federal sentencing scheme from 
one of stringent, excessive incapacitation to one that punishes the morally blameworthy”). The pursuit of 
retribution requires that “[f]irst, the primary object of criminal sanctions is to punish culpable behavior” and 
“[s]econd, the severity of the sanctions visited on the offender should be proportioned to the degree of his 
culpability.” ALLEN, supra note 28, at 66. Similarly, “[t]he penalty is . . . not  just a means of crime prevention but 
a merited response to the actor’s deed, ‘rectifying the balance’ . . . and  expressing moral reprobation of the actor 
for the wrong.” ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 51 (1976). As a principle of proportionality, retribution 
requires that “one should not be punished more harshly than one deserves.” Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional 
Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005). 
114. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66–77. 
115. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). 
116. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
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cocaine.117 The Court did not even discuss desert when it upheld Ewing’s sentence 
of twenty-fve years-to-life for shop-lifting.118 Public opinion no longer accepts 
enhanced sentencing as just.119 
Finally, sentence-enhancing legislation exacerbates racial disparities in prison 
populations. Patterns in discretionary exceptions to mandatory minimum penalties 
reveal a racial bias on the part of courts.120 Offenders can avoid being subject to 
federal mandatory minimums by way of a legislative “safety valve” that judges 
may choose to apply when sentencing nonviolent, frst-time drug offenders. Data 
reveals that a disproportionately low percentage of eligible African American 
offenders receive the beneft of this safety-valve provision.121 In California, a 2004 
report showed African American offenders comprised a higher percentage of 
second and third strikers than of prisoners generally, perhaps refecting the 
predictably cumulative effect of higher arrest and conviction rates in a recidivist 
sentencing regime.122 
In sum, the incapacitation strategies we have surveyed—the reduction of 
probation and parole, the imposition of recidivist sentences, the policing of 
possession, and the lengthening of sentences—have combined to incarcerate more 
people for longer, on the basis of their perceived danger. 
II. INCAPACITATION AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING PROPORTIONALITY 
Part I reviewed the political origins of incapacitative strategies and their 
prevalence in modern crime control. This Part reviews the role of incapacitation as 
a justifcation for punishment within Eighth Amendment proportionality jurispru-
dence. It then critically examines incapacitation theoretically, as a utilitarian 
justifcation for punishment. Finally, it critically examines incapacitation empiri-
cally, as a practice of selecting individuals for punishment on the basis of 
predictions of dangerousness. 
A. Incapacitation in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence embodies a contradiction, expressed in the 
language of the Amendment itself, prohibiting punishment that is both “cruel and 
117. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
118. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see Lee, supra note 113, at 679–84 (criticizing the plurality 
opinion for failing to take retribution into account as a side constraint in proportionality analysis). 
119. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 80 (noting a recent shift in public opinion away from longer, 
incapacitative sentences). 
120. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 185, 188–89 (2012) (explaining that Black offenders receive relief 
from mandatory minimums at signifcantly lower rate than do offenders of other races). 
121. See id. at 188. 
122. See EHLERS ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., RACIAL DIVIDE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S 
THREE STRIKES LAW ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 3 fg.1 (2004). 
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unusual.”123 A prohibition on cruel punishment sounds like a substantive right to 
decent treatment, restricting the injuries government can infict. By contrast, a 
prohibition on “unusual” punishment sounds like a procedural restriction, a 
requirement that injuries be inficted systematically, according to rules. Because 
the prohibition is conjunctive, it seems that a “cruel” punishment can become more 
acceptable by being imposed more “usually.” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on 
proportionality bears out the paradox implicit in this phrasing. Disproportionate 
punishment violates not “decency” as such, but “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”124 The Court has taken the 
punishments recently assigned by legislatures and imposed by courts as evidence 
of these evolving standards.125 Thus, proportionality review has two aspects, 
described in Graham v. Florida, which we may call comparative proportionality 
and instrumental proportionality.126 Comparative proportionality measures the 
consistency of a sentence with sentences imposed by other jurisdictions, while 
instrumental proportionality measures the consistency of a sentence with the 
justifying purposes of punishment.127 
Chief Justice Warren apparently anticipated that application of “evolving 
standards of decency” would make prevailing punishments—and therefore consti-
tutionally permissible punishments—progressively more lenient.128 Instead, in the 
face of rising crime rates, the Court’s efforts to constitutionalize criminal justice 
provoked political resistance.129 Candidates campaigned for stiffer sentences and 
less judicial discretion.130 As incarceration rates rose, sentences lengthened, and 
legislatures embraced incapacitation, these evolving standards of severity had a 
self-legitimizing effect. The comparative prong of proportionality analysis im-
peded the Eighth Amendment from checking a national movement to impose harsh 
punishments routinely.131 
Nevertheless, even when punishments are rising generally, there will be outlier 
cases—like that of Ewing—that provoke consideration of instrumental proportion-
ality. In considering the instrumental proportionality of capital punishment, the 
Court has recognized only retribution and deterrence as relevant penal purposes 
(on the assumption that imprisonment is adequate to incapacitate, and that 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
124. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
125. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 813–14 (1982); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 
(2008); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
126. GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 34–35 (2012). Youngjae Lee makes a similar distinction between 
comparative and noncomparative desert. See Lee, supra note 113, at 685. 
127. BINDER, supra note 126, at 34–35. 
128. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
129. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 93; STUNTZ, supra note 33, at 217. 
130. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 113–32 (discussing the backlash against the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure and death penalty decisions provoking attacks on the judiciary in political campaigns). 
131. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25, 29–30 (2003); supra note 113 and text accompanying note 1 
for defnitions of these concepts. The Court, however, does not defne these terms. 
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execution cannot serve rehabilitation).132 Because offenders without culpability 
are both less blameworthy and less deterrable, the Court has often reasoned that the 
proportionality of capital punishment must depend on the culpability of the 
crime.133 In Ewing, however, the Court ignored culpability, and reasoned that 
sentences of incarceration need not serve the penal purposes of retribution or 
deterrence.134 Instead, the Court held that punishment is proportional if there is a 
“reasonable basis for believing” that it advances any of the traditional justifcations 
for punishment—retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation.135 
Because the Ewing Court saw advancement of any purpose of punishment as 
suffcient to justify a term of years as proportionate, it concluded that the goal of 
incapacitating repeat offenders could justify an indeterminate life sentence for an 
ex-offender caught stealing. Because the sentence did not need to advance desert 
or deterrence, it did not matter that it was clearly out of line with the offender’s 
culpability: “To be sure, Ewing’s sentence is a long one. But it refects a rational 
legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed 
serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be 
incapacitated.”136 
Thus, Ewing seemed to leave very little space for judicial proportionality in 
reviewing noncapital sentences. In most jurisdictions a felony is simply an offense 
punishable by a year or more. If incapacitation of past offenders suffces to justify 
a life-maximum term as proportionate for any felony, legislatures are free to 
choose any sentence between a year and life for any reason or no reason. Yet, as a 
theoretical purpose for imprisonment, incapacitation means more than simply 
preventing an offender from committing certain future crimes; it requires that 
punishment improve public safety, and indeed public welfare, by achieving a net 
decrease in violent crime at an acceptable cost. 
Less than a decade after Ewing, Graham v. Florida prohibited life without 
parole for all juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.137 The Graham Court 
articulated a new “categorical” standard of proportionality applicable to review of 
entire sentencing practices, as opposed to individual sentences.138 The analysis 
consists of two prongs we have described: determining whether a sentencing 
practice is contrary to national consensus, and, if so, assessing the penalty in light 
of the defendant’s culpability and the other purposes of punishment.139 
132. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84 (1976). 
133. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 571 (2005); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). 
134. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 30. 
137. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010). 
138. Id. at 62. Categorical challenges implicate a “particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of 
offenders who have committed a range of crimes.” Id. 
139. Id. at 61–62. 
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When assessing whether sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-
homicide crimes served any legitimate purpose, the Court was moved by empirical 
evidence distinguishing juvenile and adult minds.140 Whether this preference for 
empirical evidence will become a lasting feature of proportionality jurisprudence 
is one of Graham’s many unanswered questions.141 What does seem clear is that 
Graham restored retribution as a limitation on noncapital sentencing; a sentencing 
practice that improves public safety may nonetheless be struck down as excessive 
in relation to that deserved for the offense or necessary to deter it.142 “Incapacita-
tion,” Justice Kennedy explained, “cannot override all other considerations, lest 
the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”143 
More recently, Miller v. Alabama held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles, even for homicide.144 
Miller combined Graham’s “categorical” analysis with an individualized assess-
ment of culpability that would account for a defendant’s age and “environmental 
vulnerabilities.”145 Emphasizing that “[a]n ever-growing body of research in 
developmental psychology and neuroscience” supported the distinction between 
juvenile and adult offenders, the Court again refused to credit the assumption that 
certain offenders are irretrievably depraved by virtue of the type of crime they 
committed.146 Applying the framework of Graham and Miller to recidivist statutes 
requires more rigorous examination of incapacitation’s theoretical and empirical 
assumptions. 
B. Incapacitation as a Penological Theory 
To incapacitate is to render incapable of committing crimes. Penal incapacita-
tion assumes that certain past offenders are inherently dangerous and should 
therefore be confned in state custody, where they can be monitored and controlled. 
An incapacitative justifcation for incarcerating an offender presupposes that 
offender’s propensity to commit crimes. Incarceration imposes a large social cost: 
it deprives the offender of liberty, deprives society of the beneft of any prosocial 
conduct the offender would otherwise perform, and involves cost of confning and 
maintaining the offender. To justify penal incapacitation, the offender’s expected 
crimes must be suffciently harmful, and their probability suffciently high, to 
outweigh this expected cost. In addition, there must be no less costly means of 
preventing these offenses. The only expected crimes suffciently harmful to justify 
140. Id. at 68. 
141. See Michael H. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 
1087, 1113 (2013) 
142. Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 59–60 (2010). 
143. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010). 
144. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2464 & n.5, 2465. 
20 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
the social cost of preventive confnement are violent crimes.147 
As explained by Wilson, penal incapacitation requires three assumptions. First, 
past offenders, or some identifable subgroup of past offenders, must be more 
likely than others to commit crimes in the future.148 Second, offenders removed 
from society will not be replaced by other potential offenders.149 Third, incarcera-
tion will not make offenders substantially more likely to commit crimes upon 
release than they would have been if left at large during that time.150 
Incapacitation also requires two additional assumptions that Wilson left unmen-
tioned. Thus, a fourth necessary assumption is that incarcerated offenders will not 
offend or suffer offenses at the same or greater rates while incarcerated.151 To the 
extent that crimes are committed in prison, incarceration merely shifts the risk of 
crime to a different segment of the population rather than reducing its overall 
occurrence.152 A ffth necessary assumption is that there is no less costly alterna-
tive means of achieving the same crime reduction. This ffth assumption can be 
seen as a corollary of the frst, however. If crime is caused by inherent character 
traits, environmental interventions are unlikely to be effective. Conversely, if 
crime is caused by environmental circumstances, incapacitating individuals will 
likely be less effective than altering the environment. 
Each of these assumptions is problematic.153 Consider the assumption that 
incarcerated offenders will not be “replaced” by other individuals. Even Wilson 
conceded that such replacement is likely insofar as crimes are committed by 
organizations operating in illicit markets.154 These crimes occur regardless of 
whether one individual is incarcerated.155 Moreover, in a market catering to 
addictive preferences, in which demand may not decline with higher prices, 
competing organizations may absorb the “displaced” transactions previously 
belonging to other organizations.156 While Wilson treated such offending as 
marginal, drug crimes currently constitute about one-third of annual admissions to 
147. Rummel v. Estelle, 455 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (upholding a Texas recidivist statute). 
148. WILSON, supra note 40, at 146; see Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions 
of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514–15 (1982). 
149. WILSON, supra note 40, at 146. 
150. Id.; Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS 
L. J. 536, 543 (2006). 
151. See id. at 556. 
152. See infra Part IV. 
153. Paul Robinson points to a further drawback of incapacitation—that by breaking the link between 
punishment and desert, incapacitation may erode the legitimacy of criminal prohibitions and thereby weaken their 
deterrent effect. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1432. 
154. WILSON, supra note 40, at 145; see also Todd. R. Clear, The Impact of Incarceration on Public Safety, 74  
SOC. RES. 613, 617 (2007) (explaining that “many of the crimes a person behind bars might have been involved in 
were he free occur anyway”). 
155. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 145. 
156. See Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 57 (1996). 
21 2017] PENAL INCAPACITATION 
prison.157 Crimes against property and persons motivated by drug purchase may 
also be subject to a replacement effect. But more signifcantly, the assumption that 
only black-market transactions are subject to replacement effects is baseless. 
Recall that predatory crimes like burglary and robbery are often committed by 
groups, because there is strength in numbers, and because peer pressure can 
overcome moral inhibition and fear.158 Yet the feasibility and probability of a 
group offense are not necessarily affected by the removal of one member,159 who 
may be replaced in any case. While the political rhetoric of the war on crime may 
promote images of sadistically motivated offenders,160 most crime is committed to 
obtain social or economic resources not available through more conventional 
channels.161 
Next, the assumption that incarceration will have no effect on the post-release 
rate of offending appears false.162 Indeed, some studies have found a net increase 
in crime as a consequence of high incarceration rates.163 Physical and psychologi-
cal trauma,164 recruitment into criminal networks, overcrowding, and severance of 
family and community ties are a few aspects of prison that demonstrably aggravate 
recidivism.165 The prison environment resembles a theater of war in its constant 
threat of unforeseeable violence. Adding to these effects that push ex-prisoners 
toward violence, there are also economic incentives that pull them toward crime. 
While a criminal record in itself will reduce the job prospects of offenders, a record 
of incarceration adds to these barriers, because we have a strong cognitive bias 
towards attributing misfortune to character. Thus, the infiction of a more severe 
punishment is likely to infuence potential employers to see the offender as more 
culpable and incorrigible. Unfortunately, fear of ex-convicts can make their 
recidivism a self-fulflling prophecy. 
157. Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical Distinction Between Stock and 
Flow, BROOKINGS SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/ 
posts/2015/11/25-drug-offenders-stock-fow-prisons-rothwell. 
158. Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 48, at 273–75; Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 
1307, 1316–20 (2003). 
159. Clear, supra note 154, at 617. 
160. See Esther I. Madriz, Images of Criminals and Victims: A Study on Women’s Fear and Social Control, 11  
GENDER & SOC’Y 342, 346 (1997); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 
466 (1990). 
161. See, e.g., Douglas L. Yearwood & Gerry Koinis, Revisiting Property Crime and Economic Conditions: An 
Exploratory Study to Identify Predictive Indicators Beyond Unemployment Rates, 48 SOC. SCI. J. 145, 154 (2011) 
(discussing causal relationship between labor market conditions and property crime). 
162. Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 88 (quoting United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)) (“The [prison] atmosphere makes debilitation much more likely than rehabilitation. Whether by 
introducing petty criminals to more violent offenders, forcing prisoners into racist gangs, or subjecting them to 
violence and rape, too often the prison system serves merely to exacerbate the criminal tendencies of its 
inhabitants.”). 
163. See infra Part III. 
164. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth 
Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 499, 538–39 (1997) (discussing prison-induced PTSD). 
165. See e.g., Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1051–54. 
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Nor can we assume that relocating offenders to prison will prevent them from 
committing crimes, or being victimized. By almost all accounts, prisons are brutal, 
violent places.166 Prisoners lack the opportunity to fee from threats and their 
complaints may be greeted with offcial indifference and retaliation from those 
they accuse. As many as one-in-fve male inmates reportedly experience sexual 
assault while incarcerated,167 and a recent report estimated that physical assaults 
are eighteen times more common behind prison walls for men and twenty-seven 
times more common for women.168 Prison staff also face assaults from inmates.169 
To these crimes by inmates, we must add crimes predictably committed against 
inmates by correctional staff, who are obliged to coerce and control an antagonistic 
population, while facing little risk of sanctions for abusing their authority.170 
Finally, let us turn to the foundational premise that past offenders are more 
likely than the rest of the general population to offend in the future as a result of 
intrinsic personality traits.171 As we have noted, the less confdent we are that 
crime inheres in character, the more hopeful we can be that crime can be reduced 
by improving social conditions rather than disabling individuals. Because of the 
enormous social cost of mass incarceration, incapacitation’s fundamental premise 
of inherent dangerousness should not simply be assumed. We should require 
evidence. The next Section considers the kinds of evidence that can support 
predictions of dangerousness. 
C. Selective Incapacitation and Predictions of Dangerousness 
Selective incapacitation requires predictions as to which offenders are most 
likely to recidivate. Can such predictions be made with suffcient confdence to 
justify the high social cost of incarceration beyond that required for such other 
goals as deterrence and retribution? Researchers have evaluated two methods of 
prediction: clinical assessment and actuarial assessment. Actuarial assessment has 
played a particularly important role in guiding sentencing decisions, prisoner 
classifcation, and parole decisions.172 
166. See infra Section IV.A. 
167. STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION FACILITIES 5 (2006), 
http://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/In-The-Shadows-Sexual-Violence-in-U.S.-Detention-
Facilities.pdf. According to this report, the “the rates of sexual abuse at women’s prisons vary widely, [but] at the 
worst facilities[,] as many as one in four prisoners is victimized.” Id. at 5. 
168. Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
588, 595 (2007). 
169. See Karen F. Lahm, Inmate Assaults on Prison Staff: A Multilevel Examination of an Overlooked Form of 
Prison Violence, 89 PRISON J. 131 (2009). 
170. STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 167, at 13–14 (stating that a signifcant percentage of sexual assaults 
against inmates are committed by correctional staff). 
171. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 181. 
172. Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47  
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2015). 
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1. Clinical Predictions 
Clinical assessment can be based on observation, interviews, administration of 
psychological tests, and review of case histories. Such assessments have had a 
poor track record of predictive accuracy. During the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, a consensus developed among psychologists and psychiatrists that predic-
tions could not be reliably based on clinical assessments. One analysis of ten 
studies found only a 0.10 correlation between predicted and actual reoffending by 
sex offenders.173 “Guided” clinical assessments, which consider factors linked 
empirically to violence are more effective, achieving a correlation of 0.23.174 
Nevertheless, psychologists have had some success in predicting violent recidi-
vism on the basis of a clinical diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder 
(“ASPD”).175 Under the criteria set out in the most recent Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”), ASPD consists of impairments 
in “personality function” (undeveloped sense of self) and “interpersonal function-
ing” (lack of empathy and intimacy), as well as elevated manipulativeness, 
deceitfulness, callousness, hostility, impulsivity, risk taking, and irresponsibil-
ity.176 A diagnosis of ASPD requires that these impairments are “stable across time 
and consistent across situations.”177 Thus, such a diagnosis cannot be made on the 
basis of one interview, but requires sustained observation over a long period of 
time. A recent survey of relevant studies found that 14% of individuals diagnosed 
with ASPD commit acts of violence, compared with a rate of 1–2% in the general 
population.178 
While psychopathy is not a formal diagnosis included in the DSM-5, many 
clinicians and researchers recognize it as a sub-group of ASPD with greater 
173. R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.  
50, 54 (1998); Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration at What 
Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 231 (2011). To illustrate the ineffcacy for sentencing of a predictor achieving a 
correlation coeffcient of 0.1, Hanson provides a numerical example in which 20% of a population will reoffend 
and the predictor correctly predicts reoffending only 25% of the time. Hanson, supra note 173, at 53–54. 
174. Hanson, supra note 173, at 54–55. 
175. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Diagnostic Validity of Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Prototypical 
Analysis, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 677 (1992); Glenn D. Walters, Psychopathy and Crime: Testing the Incremental 
Validity of PCL-R-Measured Psychopathy as a Predictor of General and Violent Recidivism, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
404 (2012). 
176. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS 44 (Thomas A. Widiger ed., 2012). 
177. See Jerome C. Wakefeld, DSM-5 and the General Defnition of Personality Disorder, 41 CLINICAL SOC. 
WORK J. 168, 176 (2013); see also Jasmin Wertz et al., Etiology of Pervasive Versus Situational Antisocial 
Behaviors: A Multi-Informant Longitudinal Cohort Study, 87 CHILD DEV. 312, 312 (2016) (stating that 
cross-situational antisocial behavior in children signals more “severe” pathology and helps predict likelihood of 
persistent adult offending). 
178. Rongqin Yu et al., Personality Disorders, Violence, and Antisocial Behavior: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-Regression Analysis, 26 J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS 775, 779–80 (2012). It is widely believed that ASPD is 
more prevalent in prison than in the general population. See Andrea L. Glenn et al., Antisocial Personality 
Disorder: A Current Review, 15 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 427, 427 (2013) (reporting ASPD present in 47% of 
male prisoners compared with approximately 3% of general male population). 
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potential for planned, instrumental aggression.179 However, psychopathy is often 
identifed in a single lengthy semi-structured interview, developed by Robert Hare, 
called a Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (“PCL-R”).180 Hare estimated that 
psychopaths, although comprising only 1% of the population, are responsible for 
one-third of all violent crime,181 and other researchers found that high scores on 
this test predicted very high rates of violent recidivism (77%) among offenders 
released from a maximum security psychiatric hospital.182 Yet the latter study was 
based on a very high-risk population with a base violent recidivism rate of 40%.183 
Hare developed a simplifed actuarial instrument for quickly assessing psycho-
pathic traits, referred to as the Psychopathy Checklist—Screening Version, fnding 
that future violent offenders were 70% more likely to score high on this test. This 
predictive power is similar to that of actuarial instruments based on static factors 
(past events not subject to intervention). As we shall see, however, this level of 
predictive accuracy is not adequate for predicting dangerousness within a popula-
tion with very low base rates of offending. 
Even using clinical diagnoses of ASPD would require incapacitating seven 
individuals in order to prevent violence by a single offender.184 Nevertheless, a 
diagnosis of ASPD in combination with other predictive factors might predict 
violent reoffending with greater reliability. In addition, there is some prospect for 
improving the effcacy of diagnoses of ASPD and clinical identifcations of 
psychopathy, as recent research has indicated that mechanical reading of MRI’s 
can now predict high psychopathy scores with 70% accuracy.185 Such mechanical 
diagnosis might lower costs and increase the availability of clinical prediction, but 
at present would lower its accuracy. On the other hand, conceivably at some point 
in the future, neuroimaging—or neuroimaging in combination with other tech-
179. See Glenn et al., supra note 178, at 428 (“Psychopathy, while not recognized in the diagnostic criteria of 
DSM 5, describes individuals with many of the features of ASPD, but who, in addition, demonstrate a 
characteristic set of interpersonal and affective features, including superfcial charm, manipulative-ness, callous-
ness, and shallow affect . . .  .”); Thomas Nadelhoffer et al., Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the 
Stage, 5 NEUROETHICS 67, 80 (2012). 
180. Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 179, at 80; R.D. HARE ET AL., THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST—REVISED 
PCL-R (1991). 
181. Robert D. Hare & Leslie M. McPherson, Violent and Aggressive Behavior by Criminal Psychopaths, 7  
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 35 (1984). 
182. Grant Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 632 (1991). 
183. The violent recidivism rate for non-psychopaths was 21%. Id. 
184. Yu et al., supra note 178, at 779–80. Note, however, that roughly two-thirds of those offenders with ASPD 
will commit several offenses. Id. at 784–85. 
185. See Vaughn R. Steele et al., Machine Learning of Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging Predicts 
Psychopathic Traits in Adolescent Offenders 1 (Dec. 9, 2015) (unpublished article), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. 
neuroimage.2015.12.013; B.C. Fink et al., Assessment of Psychopathic Traits in a Youth Forensic Sample: A 
Methodological Comparison, 40 J.  ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 971 (2012). On issues raised by neuroprediction 
generally, see Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 179, at 86. A useful survey of research on neuroimaging and 
prediction of violence is Yaling Yang & Adrian Raine, Prefrontal Structural and Functional Brain Imaging 
Findings in Antisocial, Violent, and Psychopathic Individuals: A Meta-Analysis, 174 PSYCHIATRY RES. 81 (2009). 
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niques—could improve prediction. Neuroimaging also has the potential to help 
identify therapeutic interventions that could obviate confnement for offenders 
presenting ASPD or psychopathy.186 
2. Actuarial Predictions 
Actuarial instruments use recidivism rates in a sample population of past 
offenders to identify correlations between reoffending and offender characteristics, 
such as being male or having a prior criminal record. Each characteristic is then 
assigned a “weight” or score based on the strength of its correlation with 
recidivism, and these weights are aggregated to predict the likelihood that a 
particular individual will reoffend. Because false positives result in needless 
incarceration, we should be sure that risk assessment tools are methodologically 
sound and reasonably accurate.187 
There is no clear consensus on the accuracy of actuarial predictions or even on 
how to evaluate the accuracy of these predictions.188 Actuarial instruments 
nevertheless play an infuential role in determining sentencing length, prisoner 
classifcation, parole decisions, and post-release civil commitment.189 Two aspects 
of actuarial tools are particularly problematic. First, actuarial tools over-predict 
dangerousness, as a large majority of offenders classifed as dangerous never 
commit violent crimes.190 Second, some factors used to predict dangerousness, 
such as credit scores or past unemployment, relate to the offender’s socioeconomic 
status rather than his disposition.191 By relying on these actuarial predictions, 
states may incarcerate offenders no more dangerous than their more fortunate 
fellow citizens, while leaving social and economic factors that encourage violence 
to continue unabated. 
Actuarial instruments inevitably produce many times more false positives than 
true positives when used to predict violent offenses or sexual offenses.192 The 
reason for this is that base rates for such offenses are generally low across the 
population. As a result, even if past violent offenders and sexual offenders are 
signifcantly more likely than the rest of the population to commit such offenses, 
their rates of violent reoffending are far lower than the popular image of 
intractably dangerous offenders would suggest. For example, a U.S. Department of 
Justice study of almost 10,000 sex offenders (almost all convicted of rape, sexual 
assault, or child molestation) found that only 5.3% were arrested for a new sex 
186. Nadelhoffer, supra note 179, at 81–82. 
187. See Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future Dangerousness 
Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 712–13 (2011). 
188. Id. at 726. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1450 (“A scientist’s ability to predict future criminality using 
all available data is poor[.]”). 
189. See Lave, supra note 173, at 213–18. 
190. Id. at 237. 
191. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1439–40. 
192. See Lave, supra note 173, at 238–39. 
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crime within the frst three years after release.193 Only 3.3% of convicted child 
molesters were rearrested for a sex crime against a child during that period.194 In 
the face of such low base rates, any tool predicting recidivism is likely to be far less 
accurate than the assumption that any given past offender will not recidivate. In the 
case of child molesters, this optimistic assumption will be accurate 97% of the 
time; in the case of sexual offenders, it will be accurate 95% of the time.195 Tamara 
Lave’s analysis of Static-99, a widely used actuarial tool with a reported accuracy 
rate of 70% in predicting sexual offending, found that every accurate prediction of 
this type of recidivism would be accompanied by a minimum of 5.6 incorrect 
positive predictions.196 Thus, actuarial tools exaggerate the likelihood that any 
particular offender poses a danger to the public.197 
Application of a predictive instrument depends on similarity between the 
sample population on which it was based and the population to which it is being 
applied.198 Yet Static-99 is based on data from British and Canadian psychiatric 
institutions and maximum security prisons.199 Both population groups present risk 
factors not present to the same extent in the general population of American 
offenders. Psychiatric inmates typically present psychoses and have been found 
dangerous or self-destructive by a court, while maximum security prisoners have 
typically committed violent crimes and have been deemed dangerous by a 
193. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 1 (2003). 
194. Id. at 24. 
195. Lave, supra note 173, at 242. 
196. Id. at 238–40, 270–71. To understand why this ratio of 5.6 false positives for every true positive is a 
minimum, and that a predictive method that is 70% accurate almost certainly performs much worse than this in 
identifying the 5.3% of sex reoffenders who will reoffend, consider three examples: 
(1) Assume that for every 1000 sex offenders, 53 will recidivate. A predictor that is 70% accurate 
in predicting both offending and non-offending will correctly identify (and incapacitate) 37 of 53 
future offenders (37 true positives, 16 false negatives), but will incorrectly identify and wrongly 
incarcerate 284 suspects (284 false positives, 663 true negatives). Thus false positives/true 
positives  284/37  7.7. 
(2) A predictor that is accurate 70% of the time that minimizes false positives will maximize false 
negatives. It also, unfortunately, would have to minimize true positives, while maximizing true 
negatives. Thus it will correctly predict and prevent 0 offenses (0 true positives, 53 false negatives) 
and will misidentify and wrongly incarcerate 247 suspects (247 false positives, 700 true 
negatives). Assuming no true positives, false positives/true positives  247/0  infnity. 
(3) A predictor that somehow miraculously identifes every future offender (53 true positives, 0 
false negatives) would also misidentify and wrongly incarcerate 300 suspects (300 false positives, 
647 true negatives). Thus false positives/true positives  300/53  5.6. This is the very best that a 
70% accurate predictor could do. Yet surely it is unlikely that all of the 300 mistakes it would make 
would be false positives and 0 would be false negatives. 
In sum, a 70% accurate predictive instrument would wrongly incarcerate somewhere between 5.6 and infnity 
suspects for every offense prevented. 
197. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1450–54. 
198. See Hamilton, supra note 172, at 36–37. 
199. Id. 
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sentencing judge. Predictions made using this data will likely exaggerate the 
probability that offenders will recidivate.200 
In fact, over-prediction may result even from sentencing offenders on the basis 
of predictive instruments developed using a population of offenders. Here the 
problem is that the mean rate of reoffending for the population of prisoners may 
greatly exceed the rate of reoffending for most offenders because of the presence in 
the population of a small group in which the rate of reoffending is very high.201 
The reasons for this may be (1) dispositional factors not captured by actuarial 
instruments, such as Antisocial Personality Disorder; (2) situational factors, such 
as social relationships with gang members; or (3) biographical factors, such as 
early abuse or lead exposure. Such hidden factors may raise the reoffending rate of 
the prison population as a whole, leading courts to overestimate the probability 
that most offenders will reoffend. 
Another way that actuarial predictions may over-predict dangerousness is by 
placing undue weight on nonviolent offenses. Many actuarial tools predict whether 
or not an offender will commit any type of future crime.202 If only violent crime 
imposes enough cost on society to warrant incapacitative incarceration,203 group-
ing all predicted crime together results in excessive incapacitation. 
Assuming that actuarial tools were able to accurately predict future offending, 
these predictions would not necessarily show that offenders possess an inherent 
criminal predisposition. Instead, predictive factors may refect situational determi-
nates of behavior that are beyond an offender’s control.204 For instance, the most 
widely used instrument for predicting general recidivism, the Level of Service 
Inventory—Revised, evaluates criminal history, education and employment, fnan-
cial resources, family and marital status, housing accommodations, leisure and 
recreation activities, companions and social infuences, alcohol and drug prob-
lems, emotional and personal diffculties, and attitudes regarding crime and 
authority.205 A prediction of “high-risk” generated by the situational factors on this 
list indicts not the individual offender but the social circumstances of the 
200. Id. 
201. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G. REP. 
237, 240 (2015). 
202. See Hamilton, supra note 172, at 19–20 (“Many instruments count any illegal act . . .  [and] operationalize 
recidivism as a simple dichotomous measure.”). 
203. See Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation: More at Stake than Controlling Violent Crime, 
62 UMKC L. REV. 107, 122–23 (1993) (citation omitted) (“Selective incapacitation is ‘the idea that an effective 
way to sanction offenders is to reserve scarce prison and jail space for those who are predictably the most 
dangerous and criminally active.’”). 
204. Haney, supra note 164, at 527–28 (“Remarkably, the diagnostic equations used to identify candidates for 
selective incapacitation actually transformed situational and structural variables such as unemployment into 
dispositional traits and used them as indices of future dangerousness.”). 
205. See Amanda L. Gentry et al., Comparing Sex Offender Risk Classifcation Using the Static-99 and LSI-R 
Assessment Instruments, 15 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 557, 559 (2005). 
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offender’s background.206 Actuarial predictions ascribe risk more often to individu-
als from marginalized communities, which are saturated with crime, poverty, 
inadequate schools, fewer employment opportunities, elevated incidence of child 
abuse and neglect, drug use and distribution, and other consequences of socioeco-
nomic blight.207 Even criminal history, while specifc to an individual offender, 
incorporates crime-inducing situational forces imposed by violent, overcrowded 
prisons and by the many barriers to reentry that follow criminal conviction. 
Law enforcement agencies also use socioeconomic factors to target potential 
offenders.208 Although political and legal constraints do not allow police to overtly 
target the unemployed, uneducated, indigent, or members of racial or national 
minorities,209 people with such characteristics are often concentrated together 
geographically.210 By mapping “hot spots” in crime-laden urban neighborhoods, 
law enforcement offcers can target marginalized community members indirectly. 
A consequence of thus deploying police will be to incapacitate offenders for some 
crimes caused by unfortunate social and economic circumstances beyond their 
control. Indeed, statistical regression models indicate that neighborhood context 
may be the greatest contributor to racial disparities in violent behavior.211 
Social and structural factors used for predictive policing are self-reinforcing, 
because increased police presence in low-income neighborhoods will lead to a 
higher rate of detection there.212 For instance, even if race has no bearing on drug 
use, users who are Black will be arrested at greater rates if police spend more time 
patrolling neighborhoods where residents are disproportionately Black.213 Police 
will not only uncover more crime where they are deployed, they will also generate 
crime, as contentious interactions between civilians and police often result in 
arrests.214 To the extent police use historical arrest data to guide resource 
206. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C.L. REV. 671, 721 (2015) (noting that “individuals 
who live in areas of concentrated poverty unjustifably face the prospect of an adverse risk profle” for reasons 
beyond their control). 
207. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 570–71. 
208. Noting the unreliability of instruments used to predict dangerousness, the RAND report observed that 
instead “short-term negative changes in life circumstances may sharply increase criminal activity,” whereas “such 
positive short-term changes as living with a girlfriend, attending school, or receiving justice system supervision 
may decrease the odds of recidivism.” See WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME 
FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 91 (2013) (emphasis added), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf. Similarly, the Virginia Sentencing Commission’s 
system of scoring dangerousness has offenders receiving “dangerousness” points for being nineteen or younger, 
unemployed, male, and single. See VIRGINIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES (VA. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
209. See Sidhu, supra note 206, at 695. 
210. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The 
Refnement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 137 (2003). 
211. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Violence, 96 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 224, 231 (2005). 
212. Harcourt, supra note 210, at 135. 
213. See id. at 146. 
214. Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1213 (2011). 
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allocation, predictive methods will entrench past racial bias in perpetuity.215 One 
prominent critic of actuarial prediction, legal and political theorist Bernard 
Harcourt, suggests that this impact on racial minorities is intentional rather than 
incidental.216 Harcourt observes that race had been openly used to evaluate 
offender dangerousness in parole decisions throughout much of the twentieth 
century.217 Only after the explicit use of race became politically unacceptable 
during the 1960s did criminal history become the most relied-upon predictor of 
dangerousness. Given that African Americans have long been overrepresented in 
prison populations, Harcourt reasons that the choice to use criminal history was 
made with an expectation of a racially disparate impact.218 
In sum, clinical predictions of dangerousness appear to lack validity unless they 
are based on either a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder, or statistical 
predictors that could be used for an actuarial assessment. Even predictions based 
on anti-social personality disorder are probably not reliable enough to justify 
confnement as cost-effective. Actuarial models tend to over-predict future danger-
ousness and their use will recommend more incarceration than is benefcial to 
public welfare. By attributing crime to offender dispositions, the use of such 
instruments discourages interventions in criminogenic environmental circum-
stances, including both situational and biographical infuences on behavior. If such 
interventions can prevent crime at less social cost, incapacitation of individuals— 
which prevents prosocial as well as antisocial conduct at great expense—is 
unwarranted. In addition, the heavy reliance of actuarial tools on past criminal 
history imposes a disproportionate toll on African American and Latino communi-
ties.219 These minority populations suffer a “ratchet effect” because criminal 
history triggers more police attention and higher sentences.220 
In deciding whether to incapacitate offenders, legislatures should weigh the 
social value of confning true positives—those correctly predicted to commit 
violent offenses—against the social cost of confning both true and false positives. 
The trade-off between prevention and its costs requires a contestable value 
judgment. But that judgment cannot even be made without estimating the number 
of true and false positives. The Supreme Court should not approve sentences as 
proportionate to the goal of incapacitation without evidence that the selection was 
215. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 240 (“[Racial] imbalance will get incrementally worse each year if law 
enforcement departments rely on the evidence of last year’s correctional traces—arrest or conviction rates—when 
setting next year’s profling targets.”). 
216. Id. at 238. 
217. Id. (noting that the use of race to predict dangerousness “ebbed in the 1970s as a result of the Civil Rights 
movement . . . but  was  nevertheless replaced with two other trends—the narrowing of the prediction instruments 
and the focusing of those tools on prior criminal history”). 
218. Id. 
219. See id. 
220. Id. at 240. 
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based on defensible methods of prediction, and that the social costs of confne-
ment, and of prediction itself, were considered. 
III. FLAWED PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF INCAPACITATION: SITUATIONISM AND 
THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR 
The previous Part showed there is little evidence that modern incapacitation 
strategies can signifcantly reduce violent crime at an acceptable cost. Yet the case 
for incapacitation is often presented as a matter of common-sense rather than 
empirical analysis. Both James Q. Wilson and Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority in Ewing, treated the preventive effects of incapacitation as self-evident. 
Such unrefective equation of confnement with prevention refects the widely 
shared assumption that crime must be caused by character. This Part critiques that 
assumption by reviewing psychological research in the feld of Attribution Theory. 
This research shows both the causal infuence of situations on behavior, and the 
tendency of lay observers to underestimate that infuence. 
Attribution theory describes the process by which people attribute each other’s 
behavior to causes either internal and person-specifc (“dispositional”) or external 
and context-specifc (“situational”).221 A dispositionalist approach to punishment 
assumes that “[c]rime resides within the person and is caused by the way he thinks, 
not his environment.”222 By contrast, a situationist approach to punishment 
construes criminal behavior by examining the immediate situational contexts in 
which behavior occurs and the biographical contexts that shape behavior over 
time. These biographical contexts can infuence behavior by affecting norms, 
preferences, skills, and opportunities; by affecting emotion; and by affecting 
physiology.223 Most contemporary psychologists view behavior as a product of the 
interaction among dispositions, biographical contexts, and situational contexts.224 
221. See Laura J. Templeton & Timothy F. Hartnagel, Causal Attributions of Crime and the Public’s 
Sentencing Goals, 54 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 44, 45–46 (2012). 
222. Haney, supra note 164, at 516, 526 (citation omitted). At the cognitive level, “disposition” refers to a 
probability that a person will exhibit a specifc behavior contingent on various situational factors. These 
probabilities, while affected by genetic makeup, are constantly “updated” to refect information collected by 
experience, so that, for instance, the probability that person X will commit crime Y increases after traumatic 
experience Z. A disposition is subject to constant change early in life then gradually stabilizes, but never becomes 
fxed. 
223. Id. at 569–70 (citation omitted) (“In spite of recent, extremist attempts to dispositionalize and biologize 
crime, modern psychological research and theory clearly support the view that the roots of criminal behavior are 
to be found in the social and developmental histories of those who perform it, and the social context in which it 
occurs.”); see also Michelle A. Coyne & John E. Eck, Situational Choice and Crime Events, 31 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. 
JUST. 12, 16 (2015) (distinguishing situational infuences of “proximate settings” and “distal social structures and 
institutions”). 
224. David. C. Funder, Towards a Resolution of the Personality Triad: Persons, Situations and Behavior, 40 J.  
RES. PERSONALITY 21, 28–29 (2006); Ryne A. Sherman et al., The Independent Effects of Personality and 
Situations on Real-Time Expressions of Behavior and Emotion, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872, 
886 (2015). 
31 2017] PENAL INCAPACITATION 
A. A Situationist Critique of Incapacitation Theory 
Penal incapacitation is arguably based on a confused account of human 
behavior. While arguing that situational strategies are necessary to control prison-
ers, incapacitation theory assumes that criminal behavior is generated by an 
offender’s dangerous disposition: that “[c]rime resides within the person and is 
‘caused’ by the way he thinks, not his environment.”225 Selective incapacitation 
conceptualizes dangerousness as a personal, immutable characteristic that can be 
observed and detected.226 But if dangerousness is truly a fxed component of 
individuals, why is it so diffcult to accurately predict who engages in violence in 
the future? Perhaps because most violence is not simply a product of individual 
disposition but is rather an effect of the dynamic interaction between individuals 
and their social environments, with the latter sometimes overwhelming the 
former.227 In light of evidence that incarcerating more people for longer does not 
reduce crime,228 crime control would be better advanced by directing resources to 
situational and biographical causes of crime.229 
In offering a situationist critique of incapacitation, we do not claim that human 
behavior is exclusively generated by situational cues. Rather, we share the 
prevailing view that behavior proceeds from the interaction among disposition, 
biography, and situation.230 Nor do we deny that some people may be disposed to 
engage in violence even under favorable circumstances. Yet much of this dispositionally-
caused crime is committed by a small percentage of offenders who exhibit 
antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy.231 While these individuals are 
225. Haney, supra note 164, at 526. 
226. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 300 (“At the heart of this construction is . . . an  assertion, based on the 
fact of persistent illegal conduct, of what he or she must inherently be.”). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 
(2015) (providing that a general purpose of criminal law is to control “persons whose conduct indicates that they 
are disposed to commit crimes”). 
227. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 502–03 (citations omitted) (citing empirical research “that variations 
in social setting and context play an extremely important causal role in the incidence of criminality, aggression 
and violence, homicide, and even torture” and that “exposure to a variety of background situations and 
developmental context (e.g., poverty and parental maltreatment) constitutes a signifcant risk factor in delin-
quency and adult criminal behavior”). 
228. See OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 4 (2015), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fles/publications/What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.pdf. 
229. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 503–04 (“[E]xclusively individual-centered approaches to crime 
control like imprisonment are self-limiting and doomed to failure if they do not simultaneously address 
criminogenic situational and contextual factors[.]”). 
230. Sherman et al., supra note 224, at 886. 
231. Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed 
by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 682 (2001) (“The results support 
the hypothesis that criminal psychopathy is associated with abnormalities in the function of structures in the 
limbic system and frontal cortex while engaged in processing of affective stimuli.”); see also David J. Cooke 
et al., Casting Light on Prison Violence in Scotland, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1065, 1075 (2008) (explaining that 
when criminogenic environment of prison is ameliorated, “residual violence will be ‘person centered,’ and can be 
addressed as such” and further explaining that one defnition of “dispositional crime” is crime that most 
individuals would not commit were they placed in a situation identical to that in which the crime is committed). 
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disproportionately present in prison populations, they nonetheless comprise a 
relatively small minority of prisoners.232 Even if it is justifable to incapacitate past 
violent offenders presenting such disorders, limiting incapacitation to this popula-
tion would greatly reduce its scale. Moreover, policy interventions affecting 
biographical infuences on disposition may reduce the scope of necessary incapaci-
tation further. 
Empirical research over the course of the twentieth century built toward the 
conclusion that personal traits are less stable than lay people assume, and 
situations play a major and often dominant role in shaping behavior. Psychologists 
have shown that “individual responses to specifc situations are surprisingly 
consistent across persons,” whereas one person’s behavior across different situa-
tions is extremely variable.233 In particular, two famous experiments showed that 
most people will engage in cruelty or violence in certain situations, and will 
impose arbitrary suffering upon an undeserving victim. This should cause us to 
question that offenders are “of ‘a different breed’ and necessarily wicked.”234 
In 1961, psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment in which he 
directed the subject (assigned the role of “teacher”) to give a series of increasingly 
painful electric shocks to another participant (the “learner”) sitting on the opposite 
side of a wall.235 The learner was in fact Milgram’s assistant.236 The teacher was 
instructed to ask the learner a series of questions; with each incorrect answer, the 
teacher was told to administer an increasingly powerful shock.237 As the shocks 
escalated, the teacher began to hear the learner screaming, complaining of chest 
pains, banging on the wall, and pleading to stop the experiment.238 Beginning at 
330 volts, the shocks met with silence.239 Before the experiment, Milgram polled 
psychiatrists, members of Yale’s faculty, random middle-class adults, and students, 
all of whom predicted that subjects would refuse the experiment.240 Psychiatrists 
“expected that only 4 percent would reach 300 volts, and that only a pathological 
fringe of about one in a thousand would administer the highest shock . . . .”241 
Incredibly, 65% of subject teachers delivered the maximum 450-volt shock, and all 
subjects delivered shocks of at least 300 volts.242 The results suggested that most 
people would commit antisocial acts—including acts of violence and cruelty—if 
232. See supra Section II.C.1. 
233. Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1395 (2003). 
234. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 300. 
235. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J.  ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 373 (1963). 
236. Id. (noting that the subject believed that the roles of Teacher and Learner were randomly assigned at the 
outset of the experiment). 
237. Id. (noting that the shock switches were labeled to indicate the level of danger posed). 
238. Id. at 374. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 375. 
241. Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1973, at 64. 
242. Milgram, supra note 235, at 375–76. 
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ordered to by an authority fgure. Moreover, the dispositions encouraging such 
behavior are not inherently antisocial. To the contrary, the deference to authority 
and cooperativeness that motivated cruel behavior here, ordinarily encourages 
compliance with law. 
Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment was another striking 
demonstration of how situational forces can overwhelm individual personality 
traits and provoke sadistic behavior in normal adults.243 Subjects244 were ran-
domly assigned roles as either a guard or prisoner in Zimbardo’s makeshift 
prison.245 Guards were prohibited from hitting or assaulting the prisoners but were 
otherwise unrestrained in their treatment of prisoners.246 Internalizing these roles, 
the guards began to dispense increasingly harsh and punitive measures when 
prisoners resisted their authority.247 They resorted to psychological and physical 
abuse without apparent hesitation, while the prisoners grew submissive and 
internalized their roles as dehumanized objects of authority.248 Conditions rapidly 
deteriorated. Prisoners were forced to defecate in small buckets which they had to 
clean with their own hands, subjected to sleep deprivation, compelled to exercise 
until physical exhaustion, and confned for hours alone in a small closet.249 By day 
three of the planned two-week experiment, one prisoner “began suffering from 
acute emotional disturbance, disorganized thinking, uncontrollable crying, and 
rage.”250 The experiment, designed to span two weeks, lasted only fve days before 
being terminated.251 
Zimbardo’s controversial experiment suggests that most people are capable of 
cruelty if placed in a situation that tends to elicit cruel behavior.252 This 
experiment has been invoked to explain how people become complicit in war 
crimes.253 Zimbardo later testifed as to the power of situational forces at a military 
hearing in defense of a U.S. soldier charged with abusing prisoners at Abu 
243. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 
1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 69 (1973). 
244. Id. at 73 (explaining that subjects were screened to eliminate individuals with criminal pasts and 
psychological problems). 
245. Id. at 72. 
246. Id. at 74–75. 
247. Id. at 89. 
248. Id. at 94. 
249. Id. at 95. 
250. DONALD O. GRANBERG & JOHN F. GALLIHER, A MOST HUMAN ENTERPRISE: CONTROVERSIES IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 42 (2010) (discussing effects of Zimbardo’s experiment on the prisoners). 
251. Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, supra note 243, at 81. 
252. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Practice Attributional Charity: Cognitive Bias in Intentional Homicide Law, 
47 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 41, 50–51 (2014); Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based 
Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35, 80–81 (1998). 
253. Arthur G. Miller et al., Explaining the Holocaust: Does Social Psychology Exonerate the Perpetrators?, 
in UNDERSTANDING GENOCIDE: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HOLOCAUST 301, 313–14 (Leonard S. Newman & 
Ralph Erber eds., 2002). 
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Ghraib,254 and published a book collecting numerous examples illustrating how 
situational forces cause deviant behavior.255 
Many people believe that violent actions are sometimes reasonable, and indeed 
the enforceability of law requires that the law justify use of force by offcials.256 
Legal defenses, including public authority, defensive force, duress, necessity, and 
provocation, refect a common understanding that violence can in certain situa-
tions be justifed or excused.257 Moreover, these defenses are usually conditioned 
on a reasonable balance of interests.258 In this sense the criminality of any 
particular act of violence can be located on a spectrum, such that the reasonable-
ness of some acts of criminal violence may fall just short of the threshold required 
for justifcation. Despite these subtleties we commonly associate violent crime 
with abject depravity. Although popular culture often portrays violent offenders as 
predators who gratuitously stalk random strangers, most violent crime occurs in 
the gray area where someone is provoked or threatened.259 The point is not that all 
people are equally inclined to engage in violence, but that criminal law does not 
evaluate violence independently from situational cues. 
Many situational determinates of crime are subtle ones that gradually over-
whelm one’s ability to resist temptation and impulse.260 It is no coincidence that 
violent crime is most common in areas of economic blight261 or that “the most 
254. Demonstrating the Power of Social Situations Via a Simulated Prison Experiment, AMERICA PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/research/action/prison.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). 
255. PHILLIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 5–8 (2007). 
256. Jonathan Jackson, et al., Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward the 
Acceptability of Violence, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 479, 486, 490 (2013); GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL LAW 334–35 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2016); Pillsbury, supra note 160, at 
451–52. 
257. Pillsbury, supra note 160, at 451–52; Bill McCarthy & John Hagan, Homelessness: A Criminogenic 
Situation, 31 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 393 (1991). 
258. Pillsbury, supra note 160, at 444–47. 
259. See id. at 461–62; Guyora Binder, Homicide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 702, 702 
(Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds. 2014) (“In most societies the majority of homicides are the unlucky 
consequences of broadly tolerated routines of violence rooted in conficting claims of social status and justifed by 
norms of sociability, loyalty, or honor.”); Dolovich, supra note 104, at 299 (“No doubt there are people in state 
custody too violent and dangerous to be released—the Charles Mansons, the Jeffrey Dahmers . . .  [b]ut it is hard 
to credit the notion that such people are anything but exceptions.”). Moreover, “the vast majority of violent crimes 
are assaults where one person hits or slaps another or makes a verbal threat. Only about 8% of the victims of 
violent crime nationally went to a hospital emergency room . . . .”  Id. at 297 n.117 (quoting a report by the 
National Criminal Justice Commission). 
260. See Catherine DeCarlo Santiago et al., Socioeconomic Status, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and Poverty-
Related Stress: Prospective Effects on Psychological Syndromes Among Diverse Low-income Families, 32 J.  
ECON. PSYCHOL. 218 (2011) (fnding a causal relationship between low income and delinquency). 
261. See, e.g., Pablo Fajnzylber et al., What Causes Violent Crime?, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1323, 1330–31 (2002) 
(documenting the positive correlation between violent crime and nations’ GDP from 1970 to 1994); Toby Seddon, 
Drugs, Crime and Social Exclusion: Social Context and Social Theory in British Drugs—Crime Research, 46  
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 680, 680 (2006) (describing how economic factors affect illicit drug markets); Kevin M. 
Drakulich et al., Instability, Informal Control, and Criminogenic Situations: Community Effects of Returning 
Prisoners, 57 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 493 (2012); see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 62 
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serious concentrations of human diffculty are invariably found huddled together 
with unemployment, poverty, housing decay, and other social disadvantages.”262 
Criminologist Toby Seddon suggests that drug trade proliferates in low-income 
communities not only to satisfy employment needs, but also “to create a meaning-
ful daily structure and identity.”263 Nor is an adequate response that not everyone 
exposed to adverse circumstances eventually becomes violent, for “while it is 
possible to overcome horrifc circumstances, horrifc circumstances do have a 
marked effect . . .  [and] that effect is larger than we are comfortable admitting.”264 
Incapacitation ignores these biographical and situational causes of crime by 
locating the roots of violent behavior exclusively in the offender’s disposition. 
This misattribution is implicit in the development of risk assessment tools, and 
allows us to avert our eyes from criminogenic conditions society has the power— 
and arguably the responsibility—to alter. 
While discounting the role that social and economic factors play in precipitating 
violence outside of prisons, incapacitation assumes that situations inside prisons 
do not generate criminal behavior.265 Yet many situational aspects of prisons 
appear to be criminogenic, and, as previously noted, prisons seem to aggravate 
recidivism.266 The constant threat of unprovoked violence tends to cause long-
term psychological trauma.267 Disruption of family and community ties “dampen 
the internal pressures to abide by law.”268 Abuse by prison guards erodes respect 
for authority and damages self-esteem.269 Overcrowding and inhumane prison 
conditions add to the physical and psychological trauma endured by many 
offenders.270 A dearth of educational and vocational programming further dimin-
ishes the likelihood for employment and successful reentry.271 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (noting that in eighteenth century France the public 
expressed “agitation . . .  against punishments for certain offences connected with social conditions such as petty 
larceny”). 
262. Seddon, supra note 261, at 680. This position is empirically supported by research on gene-environment 
interactions. See, e.g., Hexuan Liu et al., Gene by Social-Environment Interaction for Youth Delinquency and 
Violence: Thirty-Nine Aggression-Related Genes, 93 SOC. FORCES 881 (2014). 
263. Seddon, supra note 261, at 692. 
264. Rozelle, supra note 252, at 43–44. 
265. See supra Section II.B. 
266. See José Cid, Is Imprisonment Criminogenic?, 6 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 459, 471–72 (2009). 
267. Haney, supra note 164, at 538–39 (discussing prison-induced PTSD). 
268. Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1056. 
269. Haney, supra note 164, at 539–40. 
270. Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted) (“A large literature on the consequences of overcrowding has 
documented a range of specifc adverse effects on persons confned in prisons and jails, including increases in 
negative affect, elevated blood pressure, a greater number of illness complaints, higher rates of disciplinary 
infractions, and increased recidivism.”); see Karen F. Lahm, Inmate Assaults on Prison Staff: A Multilevel 
Examination of an Overlooked Form of Prison Violence, 89 PRISON J. 131. 
271. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010) (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes 
complicit in the lack of development . . .  . [I]t is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and 
rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole consideration.”). 
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To be fair, there are many prisoners whose impulsivity and indifference to 
suffering threaten the safety of others, even outside of criminogenic situations.272 
By one estimate, roughly 15–25% of male prisoners are psychopathic.273 Yet the 
resulting violence is part of the situation facing other prisoners, and further 
contributes to that situation’s criminogenic effects. The prevalence of dispositionally-
caused violence pressures the other 75–85% of prisoners to engage in defensive 
violence or preemptive displays of aggression as means of adaptation and 
survival.274 As a result, they may be infuenced in ways that render them more 
likely to commit crimes on the outside.275 
Yet even psychopaths are more likely to act violently as a result of unfavorable 
social conditions. Although psychopathy has been associated with abnormal brain 
function, such malfunction is more likely in response to an array of biographical 
aggravators, including poverty, child abuse, low socioeconomic status, and low 
parental education.276 Whether these contextual factors actually trigger psycho-
pathic “externalization” depends on an individual’s genetic sensitivity and the 
nature of the situational conditions to which the individual is exposed.277 For 
instance, psychopathic symptoms increase within days of incarceration.278 That at 
least some types of psychopathy appear responsive to therapeutic intervention 
further undermines the notion that fxed dispositional qualities underlie antisocial 
behavior. One researcher notes that “a relatively brief and focused contextual 
intervention in the frst grade can have . . . a  dramatic effect on growth of serious 
forms of antisocial behavior in adolescence.”279 Other researchers have reported 
that cognitive-behavioral therapy effectively treats at least certain types of 
psychopathy.280 
Recent research has indicated the interaction of genetic endowments and 
biographical context in the development of psychopathic behavioral symptoms. 
Researchers report that males with a certain variant of the gene Monoamine 
Oxidase A (“MAOA”) who witnessed acts of violence in childhood were more 
likely to engage in violence, impulsivity, aggression, and antisocial behavior later 
272. Kent A. Kiehl & Morris B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and 
Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 355–56 (2011). The authors also report that psychopaths are four to eight times 
more likely than other prisoners to commit violent crimes after released. Id. at 355. 
273. Id. at 356; see also STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 167, at 11. 
274. See Jenny Tew et al., Prison Culture and Prison Violence, 221 PRISON SERV. J. 15, 15–16 (2015). 
275. See Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1099. 
276. See Javdani N. Sadeh et al., Serotonin Transporter Gene Associations with Psychopathic Traits in Youth 
Vary as a Function of Socioeconomic Resources, 119 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 604, 608 (2010). 
277. See id. 
278. Haney, supra note 164, at 534. 
279. Thomas J. Dishion & Gerald R. Patterson, The Development and Ecology of Antisocial Behavior: Linking 
Etiology, Prevention, and Treatment, in 3 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 658 (Dante Cicchetti ed., 2016). 
280. See Callie H. Burt & Ronald L. Simons, Pulling Back the Curtain on Heritability Studies: Biosocial 
Criminology in the Postgenomic Era, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 223, 249 (2014). 
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in life.281 Without exposure to such situations, however, men with the high-risk 
MAOA variant were not behaviorally different from men with the low-risk 
variant.282 Other historical factors that produce antisocial behavior in combination 
with MAOA are social exclusion,283 childhood maltreatment, “material depriva-
tion,” and low education level.284 These fndings confrm that, even among people 
who are in some sense more “predisposed” to antisocial behavior than others, 
propensities toward violence can be expressed or suppressed based on contextual 
factors amenable to policy intervention.285 
Environmental hazards also have a surprising causal role in disposition-based 
behavior. Consider the apparent relationship between violent crime and lead-based 
products.286 Researchers report a striking correlation across countries, states, 
cities, and even neighborhoods between consumption of leaded gasoline and rates 
of violent crime.287 Brain images of people with moderate lead exposure show 
reduced functionality in areas of the brain responsible for emotional regulation, 
impulse control, executive function, and communication.288 Indeed, some scholars 
believe that the elimination of leaded gasoline was the most important factor in the 
dramatic drop in homicide rates during the 1990s—far more important than any 
incapacitative or deterrent effects of increased imprisonment.289 
A rational alternative to divining and punishing evil disposition is to mitigate the 
social conditions that make expression of deviance more likely. This would mean 
investing in intervention rather than incapacitation—reducing poverty, expanding 
social investment in child welfare and education, and ameliorating environmental 
281. Rose McDermott et al., MAOA and Aggression: A Gene-Environment Interaction in Two Populations, 57  
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1043, 1043, 1058 (2012). 
282. Id. at 1057. 
283. D. Gallardo-Pujol et al., MAOA Genotype, Social Exclusion and Aggression: An Experimental Test of a 
Gene-Environment Interaction, 12 GENES BRAIN & BEHAV. 140, 140 (2012). 
284. David Fergusson et al., Moderating Role of the MAOA Genotype in Antisocial Behaviour, 200 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 116, 121 (2012). 
285. In fact, biologists believe that individuals with heightened vulnerability to negative environments exhibit 
heightened potential for success in positive environments. Jay Belsky, Differential Susceptibility to Environmen-
tal Infuences, 7 INT’L J. CHILD CARE & EDUC. POL’Y 15 (2013); David Dobbs, The Science of Success, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/12/the-science-of-success/307761. 
286. See Kevin Drum, Lead: America’s Real Criminal Element, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www. 
motherjones.com/environment/2016/02/lead-exposure-gasoline-crime-increase-children-health (“Gasoline lead 
may explain as much as 90 percent of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century.”); Kim M. Cecil 
et al., Decreased Brain Volume in Adults with Childhood Lead Exposure, 5 PLOS MED. 741, 741 (2008) 
(concluding that childhood lead exposure is associated with reductions in gray matter in prefrontal cortex); Rick 
Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES. 
315, 315 (2007) (fnding “very strong association between preschool blood lead and subsequent crime rate trends” 
across nine countries). 
287. Drum, supra note 286. 
288. See id. 
289. See id.; Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead 
Exposure on Crime (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13097, 2007); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET 
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hazards. Such a strategy would aim at fostering prosocial dispositions and enabling 
prosocial behavior, rather than trying to identify and incapacitate antisocial 
dispositions. 
B. Attribution Error and Excessive Blame 
The previous Section described how antisocial behavior arises through a 
combination of genetic endowments, biographical infuences, and situational 
infuences. This Section explains why both the public and legal decision-makers 
systematically underestimate the substantial contribution of situational infuences 
to antisocial behavior. Similarly, it explains why voters, legislators, and judges 
simply presume that crime is caused by character, rather than basing their 
understanding of crime on empirical evidence. To all of these actors, the responsi-
bility of criminals for crime is a matter of common sense. To the extent that we see 
crime as evidence of bad character, we will see constant confrmation of the 
assumption that people of bad character are disposed to commit crimes. 
Our weak ability to perceive situational causes of crime is a result of attribution 
errors documented by cognitive psychology. Foremost among these is the Funda-
mental Attribution Error (“FAE”), the tendency for observers to overestimate the 
role of dispositional factors in explaining behavior, while failing to recognize 
situational forces at play.290 FAE induces us to attribute crime entirely to an 
offender’s disposition.291 By magnifying the causal role of a defendant’s character 
relative to other variables affecting behavior, FAE induces excessive blame, which 
in turn encourages excessive punishment.292 Incapacitation theory purports to 
promote utility, without regard to desert, but humans cannot overcome their own 
cognitive biases just by stipulating them away. A utilitarian may reject retribution 
as an aim of punishment, but cannot so easily resist attribution. 
Early experiments establishing the Fundamental Attribution Error demonstrated 
the irrational resistance of subjects to situational explanations of behavior.293 In 
1967, Edward Jones and Victor Harris divided students into two groups and 
instructed them to read an essay by a student who had been assigned either to 
support or oppose Fidel Castro.294 Both groups were then asked to rate the writers’ 
“true” beliefs regarding Castro.295 Even knowing that the writer had no choice 
over what to write, subjects who had read the pro-Castro essay rated the writer’s 
beliefs as far more pro-Castro than did the students who read the anti-Castro essay, 
290. Ross, supra note 21. 
291. Dripps, supra note 233, at 1399. 
292. See id. at 1428. 
293. Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3  
(1967). 
294. Id. at 4, 8. 
295. Id. 
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and vice versa.296 Hence, subjects failed to account for salient situational con-
straints and accordingly drew baseless conclusions about authors’ positions on a 
controversial topic. In another classic experiment, observers rated basketball 
players shooting free throws in a well-lit gymnasium as signifcantly more skilled 
than basketball players in a dimly-lit gymnasium, even though the former (who 
were in fact no more skilled) held a clear situational advantage.297 Over-attribution 
of outcomes to individuals appears to be partly culturally determined, as the effect 
is more pronounced in Western cultures and particularly in the United States.298 
FAE is notable for the strength of its effect on the observer. For instance, 
subjects in one study were told that Person A had been more honest or friendly than 
Person B on a particular occasion, then asked to estimate the probability that 
Person A would also be more honest or friendly in a subsequent situation.299 
Whereas the actual probability (based on other studies of cross-situational behav-
ior) was roughly 55%, subjects on average estimated an 80% likelihood.300 This 
remained true even “when the question spelled out the nature of the situation, 
making it very clear that participants were being asked to predict behavior in a 
very different kind of situation.”301 More generally, correlation in trait-related 
behavior in two separate situations eliciting certain traits (like honesty or friendli-
ness) is 0.15, but is perceived to be 0.80.302 So, not only do we overestimate the 
consistency and relevance of intrinsic character, we overestimate substantially. 
A related cognitive bias is the Just World Fallacy, the assumption that conse-
quences of an action refect the morality of the actor.303 We attribute the misfortune 
of others to dispositional faws rather than external factors, in order to preserve our 
belief that people usually get what they deserve. Taking a more situationist 
perspective on behavior would be psychologically unsettling and cognitively 
taxing, because situational forces are more diffcult to ascertain and control. 
Borrowing from Milgram, Melvin Lerner documented the Just World Fallacy by 
having subjects watch what they believed was a live video of a volunteer receiving 
painful electric shocks.304 One group of subjects was permitted to intervene, while 
296. Id. at 7, 11. 
297. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1397. 
298. Salil K. Mehra, Blaming: Harm Attribution in the United States and Japan, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 39 (2013); 
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are 
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 380–81 (2008) (citations omitted) (“A burgeoning cultural-psychology 
literature shows how Western cultures tend to be more dispositionist than Eastern cultures.”). 
299. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 432–34 (1999). 
300. Id. at 434. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 433–34. 
303. Adrian Furnham, Belief in a Just World: Research Progress Over the Past Decade, 34 PERSONALITY & 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 795, 802–03 (2003). 
304. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human 
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 101–02 (2004). 
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the other had no choice to but continue watching.305 Afterwards, subjects given no 
choice to intervene were far more critical and disparaging in their feedback of the 
volunteers and awarded them less compensation.306 In Lerner’s own words, “the 
sight of an innocent person suffering without the possibility of reward or compen-
sation motivated people to devalue the attractiveness of the victim in order to bring 
about a more appropriate ft between her fate and her character.”307 The lesson: 
rather than accept that bad things happen to good people, we prefer to think of 
people to whom bad things happen as bad. 
Attribution errors affect every part of our justice system.308 For instance, jurors 
often treat as highly probative a confession that is patently coerced,309 attributing 
the confession to the individual’s guilty conscience even when the coercive factors 
producing the confession have been explained to them.310 Factfnders infer guilt 
based on seemingly irrelevant character evidence.311 Factfnders exhibiting strong 
just-world beliefs are more likely to impose longer sentences on individuals from 
low socioeconomic profles.312 Some psychologists believe this phenomenon 
explains juror attribution of blame to rape victims and skepticism regarding claims 
of abuse.313 
Attribution biases infuence our perception of entire groups, not just individu-
als.314 A meta-analysis of empirical studies concluded that group members are 
more likely to attribute positive behavior of fellow group members to dispositional 
qualities and negative behaviors to situational factors.315 On the other hand, we 
generally attribute negative behavior of members of groups to which we do not 
belong to dispositional traits common to all members of that group.316 These 
patterns can affect sentencing:317 “White jurors more readily believe that blacks 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 101 (quoting Melvin L. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, The Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 
85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1032 (1978)). 
308. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1385–86 (proposing that the fundamental attribution error “has important 
and disturbing implications for the theory and practice of criminal law” and that its existence helps explain the 
doctrines of attempt and felony murder); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges 
to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2003) (explaining the failure of entrapment claims 
in terms of dispositional attribution errors). 
309. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions, and Mock 
Jury Verdicts, 11 J.  APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 489 (1981). 
310. See id. 
311. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial 
Evidence, 58  WASH. L. REV. 497, 528–29 (1983). 
312. See id.; Naomi J. Freeman, Socioeconomic Status and Belief in a Just World: Sentencing of Criminal 
Defendants, 36 J.  APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2379, 2387–88 (2006). 
313. Rozelle, supra note 252, at 48. 
314. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326. 
315. Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 903 
(2015). 
316. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326. 
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will continue to be dangerous in the future and are more likely to ignore mitigating 
evidence, treating instances of the defendant’s bad character as more representa-
tive of the ‘true character’ of people of ‘his kind’ than instances of good 
behavior.”318 
C. Attribution Errors and Incapacitation Theory 
Attribution errors are likely to distort decision-making within institutions 
pursuing the goal of incapacitation, causing decision-makers to over-attribute 
crime to dispositions and so to over-predict recidivism.319 Yet attribution error not 
only distorts our judgment of offenders, it also distorts our judgment of incapacita-
tion theory itself, lending it unmerited credibility.320 This Section argues that 
incapacitation’s key assumptions are all bolstered by cognitive misattribution. 
The most important assumption of penal incapacitation is that past offenders are 
likely to reoffend. This assumption is unexceptionable if interpreted to mean only 
that past offenders are, in the aggregate, somewhat more likely to offend than the 
general population. After all, if some persons are disposed to offend at a high rate, 
and these are over-represented among offenders, offenders as a group will be more 
likely to offend than the general public. Yet thus interpreted, the assumption would 
not justify incapacitation as welfare maximizing. The Fundamental Attribution 
Error reassures us that each offender is disposed to commit crime. When Wilson 
insists that incapacitation requires no assumptions about human nature,321 he 
implies that we need not know or alter the situational determinants of crime in 
order to prevent it. When the Supreme Court in Ewing and other cases approves 
recidivist sentencing enhancements on the ground that recidivists “by repeated 
criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the 
norms of society” it treats offenses themselves as conclusive evidence that 
offenses are entirely caused by dispositions.322 In treating recidivism as self-
explanatory, Justice O’Connor ignored the fact that convictions makes reintegra-
tion diffcult, by restricting an offender’s social and economic opportunities.323 
318. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.  
121, 126 (2006); see also Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, 
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 768 n.53 (2005). 
319. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1428–29; Lelling, supra note 252, at 39. 
320. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 303 (2003) (“If . . .  fundamental 
attribution error contributes to false impressions and self-understandings, and misguided legal theories and laws, 
then it should fnd support in the major social policy disputes that animate and defne our history.”); Dolovich, 
supra note 104, at 305 (“The appeal of the individualist framework is not hard to fathom. If the causes of crime are 
wholly internal, exclusively the product of an individual’s inherent disposition, crime prevention becomes a 
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321. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 145–46. 
322. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)). 
323. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 104, at 280–82. 
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Thus recidivism can as easily be explained by situational as by dispositional 
factors. 
The second assumption of incapacitation theory—that incapacitated criminals 
will not be replaced—is also bolstered by attribution errors.324 Studies consistently 
show that people underestimate the degree to which discrete situations elicit the 
same behavior from different people.325 Replacement effects are not unique to 
illegal drug markets. In a study about the effcacy of administrative segregation, 
prison administrators noticed that segregating disruptive prisoners simply gave 
rise to “a new crop” of problematic prisoners.326 The natural organization of prison 
into a hierarchy of social roles likely had more to do with generating disruptive 
behavior than any of the individual prisoners.327 As noted above, robbery and 
burglary are often committed in groups as well.328 Crime is committed in groups 
for the same reason that most other human activities take place in groups—because 
people are sociable. And as Milgram and Zimbardo demonstrated, most people 
will do what those around them seem to expect of them. If much crime is generated 
by social infuences that would lead most similarly situated people to commit the 
same crime, then incapacitation does not systematically target crime so much as it 
targets individuals who “lack the ability to extricate themselves from . . .  crime-
producing settings.”329 
Attribution error similarly causes courts and policymakers to underestimate the 
possibility that incarceration increases the rate of offending after release.330 
Physically and psychologically traumatized, prisoners may leave prison more 
likely to commit violent crime than when they entered,331 less employable, and 
more likely to form social relationships with others who have been similarly 
stigmatized. Attribution of offending to disposition effaces these social infuences 
on offending. 
That most behavior appears consistent with both situational and dispositional 
inferences allows attribution errors to go undetected over time: “[b]ecause the 
people we observe will tend to behave as if they are motivated by disposition and 
not situation, the data we collect will appear to confrm our fawed dispositionist 
conception of the humans we are observing[.]”332 This is how attribution errors 
324. See supra Section II.B. 
325. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1395. 
326. Cooke et al., supra note 231, at 1072. 
327. See Sharon Dolovich, Two Models of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A. 
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sustain the backwards logic of incapacitation.333 It induces us to reinterpret every 
instance of deviant conduct as an expression of antisocial character, thereby 
reinforcing our common sense view that character causes conduct. 
IV. INCAPACITATION AS SEGREGATION RATHER THAN CRIME CONTROL 
As we have observed, utilitarianism is fundamentally egalitarian. Within a given 
society, the pursuit of “public utility”334 weighs equally the welfare of all and 
pursues “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” regardless of their 
identities.335 Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, the utility of prisoners counts as 
part of the public utility, and the harm to offenders is a cost that makes punishment, 
insofar as applied, always a necessary evil.336 Penal incapacitation cannot be fairly 
characterized as serving public utility, unless the crime prevented outside of prison 
exceeds the resulting crime that occurs in prison, including crime committed 
against prisoners. Crime prevented must also be weighed against any additional 
crime outside of prison generated by incarceration, and any additional social 
costs.337 
Judged by the standard of utility, modern incapacitation strategies have failed. 
The shift from rehabilitative to incapacitative aims has been accompanied by a 
great increase in incarceration and its social cost, with at most a small effect on 
violent crime.338 Our very limited ability to predict which offenders will commit 
violent crimes precludes a strategy of selective incapacitation. While purporting to 
select for dangerousness, we have effectively adopted a strategy of collective 
incapacitation and thereby achieved mass incarceration, at a substantial expendi-
ture of resources and waste of human capacity. Since incapacitation strategies do 
not achieve utility, it seems probable that they have prevailed and persisted 
because of their distributive or expressive effects. 
333. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 278; Donald Braman et al., Some Realism about Punishment 
Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1600–01 (2010). 
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11–13 (J.H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (distinguishing public utility and private utility). 
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Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1977). 
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338. RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Incarceration & Crime: A Complex Relationship 2–4 
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deterrent effects). 
44 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
This Part explores these distributive and expressive dimensions of incapacita-
tion. It argues that the effect of incapacitation strategies is less to reduce the cost of 
crime and crime control than to redistribute it to offenders and their communi-
ties,339 and to thereby stigmatize them as less worthy of social protection. 
Moreover, the fact that African Americans bear a disproportionate share of this 
redistributed risk gives this stigma further signifcance as a continuation of the 
legacy of slavery and segregation. 
A. Crime in Prison 
As we have seen, incapacitation theory rests on the assumption that violent 
crime is dispositional—that its cause inheres in the characters of those who 
commit it, rather than their social circumstances. On this assumption, the transfer 
of violent offenders from one social environment to another might not be expected 
to alter their rates of offending. The assumption that incarceration incapacitates 
potential offenders requires that either (1) violent crime will not occur in prison at 
equal or greater rates, or (2) violent crime in prison simply does not count. That 
Wilson did not specify any empirical assumption about the effectiveness of prison 
in suppressing violence when he frst proposed a strategy of incapacitation 
suggests the second alternative: that he was not counting the welfare of prisoners 
as part of the social welfare calculus. 
It is widely acknowledged that violence occurs in prison, although prisoners 
may face retaliation if they report assaults by either fellow prisoners or guards, and 
prison offcials may have little incentive to ascertain and publicly acknowledge the 
extent of violence.340 Prisons were particularly violent in the 1970s when Wilson 
frst proposed that incarceration be increased. Offcially reported prison homicide 
rates ranged as high as 600 per 100,000 inmates in some states.341 For 1972, the 
rate of offcially reported homicides for prisons nationwide was 70 per 100,000, 
compared to 7 for the nation as a whole.342 Suicide is also an important metric of 
prison violence, as it is often an effort to escape constant threats of violence from 
other prisoners, and homicides may be misclassifed as suicides by authorities.343 
In 1980, the offcially reported prison homicide rate was 54 per 100,000 and the 
339. See Susan Dimock, Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain Dangerous Offenders, 9  
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 537, 540 (2015) (“Incapacitation as a tool of crime control affects the rate of crime, not by 
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Society, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 757 (2008). 
341. See DAVID A. JONES, THE HEALTH RISKS OF IMPRISONMENT 151–55 (1976); LEE H. BOWKER, PRISON 
VICTIMIZATION 23 (1980). 
342. Colin C. Carriere, The Dilemma of Individual Violence in Prisons, 6 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 195, 202 
(1980). 
343. California Corrections: Confronting Institutional Crisis, Lethal Injection, and Sentencing Reform in 
2007, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 117, 121 (2008). 
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suicide rate was 34 per 100,000.344 In 1983, jails reported a very low homicide rate 
of 5 per 100,000, but an astronomical suicide rate of 129.345 Assault was also 
prevalent, as a 1977 study of North Carolina prisons reported an offcial rate of 
7,000 per 100,000, while a victim survey found that 78% of inmates reported 
suffering assaults.346 Sexual assault was also prevalent, although rarely reported. 
Some victim surveys reported rape rates as high as 14,000 per 100,000, while even 
higher numbers of inmates reported being sexually assaulted or harassed.347 In 
light of these data it does not seem that incarceration was inhibiting violent 
offending by prisoners during the period when Wilson proposed his incapacitation 
strategy. Indeed, it seems likely that prison conditions were having a criminogenic 
effect. 
As incarcerations rates rose, inmate homicide and suicide rates fell. From 1980 
to 2002, prison homicide rates dropped from 54 to 4 per 100,000 and suicide rates 
dropped from 34 to 14. From 1983 to 2002, jail homicide rates dropped from 5 to 3 
per 100,000 and suicide rates dropped from 129 to 47.348 These declines have been 
ascribed to better security measures, better emergency medical care, and a greater 
proportion of nonviolent offenders in the now much larger inmate population.349 
On the other hand, rates of assault and sexual assault remained high. A 2007 study 
found that physical assault against a male is roughly 18 times more likely in prison 
than in the general population.350 While the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a 
rate of only 315 sexual assaults per 100,000 reported to prison authorities in 
2004,351 a 2003 Human Rights Watch analysis of victim surveys estimated that 
between 10% and 30% of prison and jail inmates had been sexually assaulted.352 
The failure of incapacitation’s proponents to consider prison violence suggests 
that their aim was not to reduce the risk of violent crime as such, but to redistribute 
that risk from innocents to past offenders.353 Indifference to violence among 
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inmates is inconsistent with the utilitarian premise that the welfare of all members 
of society counts equally. Indeed, the position that only non-offenders deserve 
protection from violence would seem to be a principle of retributive desert rather 
than utility. We might better refer to the aim of separating potentially violent 
offenders from the innocent as “segregation” rather than “incapacitation” of 
offenders. Such segregation of offenders not only sets them apart from “society” 
physically—it also sets them apart from “society” expressively, by implying that 
their welfare does not count as part of the social welfare. As punishment theorist 
Sharon Dolovich observes, by excluding the offender from society both physically 
and expressively mass incarceration treats the prisoner as “someone without moral 
or political standing, someone outside the circle of humanity, to whom few if any 
obligations are owed.”354 Physical separation is a powerful way to distance 
ourselves emotionally from those on whom we infict suffering.355 Milgram and 
Zimbardo have shown that the potential for such cruelty exists in all of us. Mass 
incarceration is our Zimbardo experiment. 
B. Community Effects of Incarceration 
The costs of incarceration include collateral harm to the families and communi-
ties of prisoners. Incarceration rates vary dramatically across neighborhoods, some 
losing substantial portions of their potential wage earners to prisons while other 
neighborhoods in the same city lose almost none.356 The return of traumatized and 
unemployable ex-prisoners to these neighborhoods creates additional risk of 
violent crime.357 
Often the families of offenders become incapacitated by proxy, losing capacity 
for prosocial conduct. Incarceration dismantles family units. Marriage rates 
decline.358 The education of children is affected negatively when a parent is 
incarcerated.359 Children are more likely to offend if one of their parents is 
incarcerated.360 The remaining parent becomes more likely to abuse or neglect 
children, while research indicates that abuse or neglect increases a child’s risk of 
redistribution of the risk they pose is justifed because it is a reasonable response to their fault in being dangerous 
to their fellows, which status is incompatible with full membership in the social contract.”). 
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supra note 73, at 1082 (estimating that the criminogenic impact of parental incarceration increases crime by four 
percent). 
358. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 497. 
359. See John Hagan & Holly Foster, Intergenerational Educational Effects of Mass Imprisonment in America, 
85 SOC. EDUC., 259, 277–79 (2012). 
360. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 493 (claiming high incarceration rates create criminogenic situations 
in certain neighborhoods by disrupting social networks and local economy). 
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juvenile arrest by 55% and increases the risk of committing a violent crime by 
nearly twofold.361 
Incarceration destabilizes local housing markets by removing income-earning 
adults from their homes.362 Many single-parent households are unable to retain 
their homes and are forced to “double-up” with other families or face homeless-
ness.363 Constant parole revocation causes the “churning” of offenders into and out 
of high-crime, low-income neighborhoods, and prevents the growth of stable 
familial and community relationships.364 In turn, high-risk neighborhoods lack the 
social capital and economic resources to effectively address local crime problems.365 
A criminal history creates a stigma that makes even the most capable ex-
offender unlikely to fnd stable employment.366 Imprisonment often disrupts or 
precludes education,367 and the scarcity of education and training in prisons does 
not help. By one estimation, only one out of fve released offenders fnds stable 
employment after leaving prison.368 Many state and federal laws render prisoners 
ineligible for student loans.369 Even food stamps and basic forms of public 
assistance are denied offenders.370 Meanwhile, pervasive criminal background 
checks ensure that an offender’s sentence follows him to job interviews.371 Exiled 
from the legal labor market, prisoners seek income and a restored sense of purpose 
in illegal markets. In all these ways, incarceration begets incarceration by entrench-
ing conditions of poverty and social exclusion.372 Sociologist Loic Wacquant 
describes the result as a “carceral continuum which entraps a redundant popula-
tion . . . who  circulate in a closed circuit between its two poles in a self-
361. Shay Bilchik & Michael Nash, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin, JUV. &  
FAM. JUST. TODAY (Fall 2008), http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Fall-08-NCJFCJ-Today-
feature1.pdf. 
362. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 509. 
363. See generally Deborah M. Thompson, Breaking the Cycle of Poverty, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1209, 
1210 n.3 (1998) (discussing the diffcult task of counting homeless youth and families, especially given the fact 
that some families double up with other families and never enter a shelter). 
364. See Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 497 (discussing the effect of high incarceration rates on “the social 
processes on which informal social control depends: participation in voluntary associations, feelings of 
community solidarity, and neighboring activities”). 
365. Id. 
366. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960–62 (2003). 
367. See Hagan & Foster, supra note 359. 
368. Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of Prisoner Reentry, 
Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J.  ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 262 (2006). 
369. See Nick Anderson, Advocates Push to Renew Pell Grants for Prisoners, Citing Benefts of Higher 
Education, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/when-congress-cut-pell-
grants-for-prisoners/2013/12/03/fedcabb2-5b94-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html. 
370. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2016) (barring federals benefts for persons convicted of a felony). 
371. Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 
20. J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 276–78 (2004). 
372. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 307 (“At a minimum, it seems clear that a system that responds to crime 
with conditions certain to (re)produce antisocial behavior will fnd itself relying more and more heavily on a 
carceral response.”). 
48 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
perpetuating cycle of social and legal marginality . . . .”373 
In sum, incapacitation strategies predictably impose the costs of crime control, 
not only on offenders, but on their families and neighborhoods. The result is to 
broaden the class of expected offenders and to proliferate the spaces in which 
crime risk is both concentrated and confned.374 That proponents of incapacitation 
ignore these collateral consequences of incarceration suggests that they are 
excluding entire communities from the social welfare calculus. 
C. Permanent Exclusion as Denunciation 
Life sentences for repeat offenders like the one upheld in Ewing v. California 
cannot be justifed or understood as cost-effective ways to prevent violent crime. 
Were effcient prevention the goal, prisoners would be released when they no 
longer pose a threat to the general population.375 The relationship between crime 
and age is well documented, most studies showing that criminal behavior declines 
sharply as individuals reach their late twenties.376 “Aging inmates” (ffty years and 
older) recidivate at less than half the rate as other former prisoners.377 Yet a Justice 
Department report acknowledged that an inordinate number of elderly offenders 
are incarcerated,378 largely as the result of incapacitative sentencing policies: the 
elimination of parole and the introduction of mandatory minimums, and longer 
sentences.379 The majority of these individuals pose no substantial threat to the 
public, require health services not available in prisons, and cost the public far more 
money to incarcerate than other prisoners.380 The predictable wastefulness of 
lengthy recidivist sentences strongly suggests that they serve expressive rather 
than instrumental purposes. They denounce recidivists as unworthy to participate 
in society by permanently banishing them. 
D. The Opportunity Costs of Incapacitation 
A fourth way that incapacitation strategies express contempt for offenders and 
their communities is by preferring costly and ineffective methods of crime control, 
that harm them, over cheaper and more effective methods that would beneft them. 
Such pro-social crime-preventive strategies are readily available. First, because 
373. Loı̈c Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 377, 384 (2000). 
374. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 240. 
375. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1451. 
376. See, e.g., id. 
377. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, The Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons iii (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf. 
378. Id. at 37, 42. 
379. Id. at 3. 
380. Id. 
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crime is strongly associated with poverty, any policy that reduces poverty is also 
likely to reduce violent crime.381 Other social welfare strategies shown to reduce 
crime include prison education and job-training;382 prisoner reentry services;383 
drug treatment programs;384 prison work release programs;385 cognitive-
behavioral psychotherapy;386 realigning fnancial incentives for parole agencies to 
achieve lower revocation rates;387 and reducing exposure to environmental toxins, 
such as lead.388 It seems that proponents of incapacitation are willing to spend 
public resources to confne potential offenders, but not to offer them rewarding 
alternatives to crime. This perverse choice seems premised on the view that 
providing such opportunity would reward them for their criminal dispositions.389 
E. Incapacitation as Racial Segregation 
As we have noted, mass incarceration segregates in the sense that it excludes 
offenders and their communities from the social welfare calculus. Yet the dispro-
portionately minority composition of the inmate population means that mass 
incarceration also perpetuates an earlier history of racial segregation.390 The 
emergence of a successful electoral politics of “law and order” immediately after 
the civil rights movement’s successful campaign against de jure segregation 
suggests that the resulting war on crime was also a reassertion of racial hierarchy. 
The skewed racial composition of the large inmate population it produced supports 
this interpretation. Thus, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that black men 
were imprisoned at more than six times the rate of white men in the last quarter of 
381. See generally Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a 
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 10 (1985) (indicating a direct correlation 
between policies reducing poverty and those reducing violent crime). 
382. John H. Esperian, The Effect of Prison Education Programs on Recidivism, 61 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 
316, 316–17 (2010). 
383. Nora Wikoff et al., Recidivism among Participants of a Reentry Program for Prisoners Released Without 
Supervision, 36.4 SOC. WORK RES. 289, 289 (2012). 
384. Elizabeth J. Gifford et al., The Effects of Participation Level on Recidivism: A Study of Drug Treatment 
Courts Using Propensity Score Matching, 9 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION & POL’Y 40 (2014). 
385. Grant Duwe, An Outcome Evaluation of a Prison Work Release Program: Estimating Its Effects on 
Recidivism, Employment, and Cost Avoidance, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 531, 531–35 (2015). 
386. Chris Hansen, Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions: Where They Come from and What They Do, 72 FED. 
PROBATION 43, 43, 45–46 (2008). 
387. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING: ALIGNING FISCAL AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PRODUCE MORE SAFETY AT LESS COST 2 (2012), http://www.vera.org/fles/performance-incentive-funding-
report.pdf. 
388. See Drum, supra note 286. 
389. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 11, 22 (1977) (denying that 
society lacks moral standing to punish if it fails to eradicate poverty, because crime is chosen rather than caused 
by social conditions, and offenders rather than the public should bear the cost of crime control). 
390. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010) (explaining the relationship between the 
disproportional amount of minorities that are imprisoned and the history of early segregation). 
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the twentieth century.391 About as many African American men are inmates today 
as were slaves in 1850.392 
In a regime that punishes on the basis of predicted dangerousness—literally 
prejudice—cognitive biases make racial discrimination almost inevitable. If group 
members are more likely to attribute blame to members of other groups, members 
of minority groups are more likely to be blamed.393 The Just World Fallacy makes 
us especially prone to blame those who are poorer and less fortunate. As Bernard 
Harcourt has observed, in a regime where criminal history is the primary predictor 
of dangerousness, the effect of any such racial discrimination will be compounded 
again and again, making “risk . . . a  proxy for race.”394 
V. INCAPACITATION AND THE FUTURE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY 
Penal incapacitation is based on fawed psychological assumptions that, in the 
present state of knowledge, cannot be used to rationally select offenders for 
incarceration. This circumstance may change, as the combined use of actuarial 
assessment, clinical observation, neuroimaging, and genetics may improve our 
ability to predict violence. Yet it is also possible that such scientifc advances will 
enable therapeutic interventions that will obviate confnement as a means of 
arresting that danger. We must also recognize that the methods of prediction 
adopted by legislatures, sentencing judges, parole boards, and other offcials may 
fall short of scientifc best practices. If prediction improves suffciently, truly 
selective incapacitation may become possible and may be justifed as preventive in 
some cases. We do not rule out the possibility that some practice of selective 
incapacitation could withstand searching scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 
Yet such justifable incapacitation would probably be much smaller in scope than 
our current apparatus of mass incarceration. Offcials might well conclude that 
391. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. 
POPULATION, 1974–2001 56 (2003) (indicating that African Americans constitute 40% of the inmate population 
despite making up only 13% of the general population); Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 
2010 Census: State-By-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html. 
392. Compare E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 29 app. tbl.3 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (“Percent of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of state or federal 
correctional authorities, by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin”) (indicating that there were 516,900 African 
American male prisoners in federal or state facilities in 2014) and TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 3 tbl.2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf 
(“Percent of inmates in local jails, by characteristics, midyear 2000 and 2005–2014”) (noting 85.3% of jail 
inmates in 2014 were male) (noting that there were 263,800 African Americans in local jails in 2014) with U.S. 
CENSUS, STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 90–91 tbl.83 (showing that there were 696,764 African 
American male slaves age twenty and over in 1850). 
393. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1433 (explaining FAE causes “observers systematically . . . to  exaggerate 
the degree of culpable wrongdoing” of offenders); see also Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326 
(observing prejudice to minority defendants wrought by FAE). 
394. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 237. 
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such modest predictive success would not repay the effort and expertise required to 
achieve it. 
Barring substantial improvement in predictive success (unaccompanied by a 
similar improvement in therapeutic success), how should our critique affect the 
role of incapacitation in Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis? Recall that 
in Ewing v. California the Court reasoned that California’s recidivist sentencing 
statute embodied “a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that 
offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to 
commit felonies must be incapacitated.”395 Under Ewing, a rational belief that 
incapacitating an offender improves public safety is enough to render the sentence 
constitutional; the sentence need not be proportional to culpability, desert, or 
deterrence.396 
However, there is reason to doubt Ewing’s continued standing in Eighth 
Amendment law, at least where an offender challenges the constitutionality of a 
“sentencing practice” rather than an individual sentence. Recall that in Graham v. 
Florida, which barred life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of 
non-homicide offenses, the Court introduced an entirely new analysis derived from 
its death penalty cases.397 Under Graham, the Court asks whether a national 
consensus opposes the sentencing practice in question.398 If so, the Court indepen-
dently compares the culpability of an offender with the severity of his punishment, 
as well as the extent to which a sentence advances the penological justifcations of 
punishment.399 Unlike Ewing, which required only that one justifcation be 
advanced, Graham requires consideration of all four penological goals: rehabilita-
tion, retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.400 Indeed, the retributive injustice 
of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crime outweighed 
whatever benefcial incapacitative effects could be expected, and the prospect for 
juvenile rehabilitation weighed heavily against the dubious assumption that 
Graham “would be a risk to society for the rest of his life.”401 
Writing for the majority in Graham, Justice Kennedy distinguished previous 
cases as challenges to particular sentences rather than to entire “sentencing 
practices.”402 Yet this distinction is elusive.403 Assessment of the proportionality of 
any particular sentence would seem to require comparison of like sentences for 
like crimes, and perhaps consideration as to whether they have been committed by 
395. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003). 
396. Id. 
397. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2010). 
398. Id. at 62. 
399. Id. at 67–68. 
400. Id. at 71–74. 
401. Id. at 73. 
402. Id. 
403. Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1, 3  
(2010). 
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offenders with similar characteristics. It would seem that this analysis implicates 
“a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have 
committed a range of crimes.”404 Could not a defendant in Ewing’s position 
challenge the “practice” of punishing nonviolent recidivists with life sentences? 
Could not a defendant like Allen Harmelin challenge Michigan’s practice of life 
imprisonment for frst time offenders convicted of drug possession?405 There is no 
obvious reason why future defendants cannot trigger Graham’s more searching 
proportionality review by simply proposing a categorical ban on the applicable 
sentencing practice. And while Graham and Miller insisted that “children are 
different” for Eighth Amendment purposes, they found age to be relevant only 
because age bears on culpability.406 It would be strange to recognize culpability as 
pertinent to desert and deterrence for juveniles but not adults. Thus it seems likely 
that, in cases where a sentencing practice is challenged, Graham has revived the 
retributive constraint on punishment that the Court neglected in Ewing.407 
An alternative interpretation would be that the Court required justifcation of 
juvenile life without parole by reference to desert and deterrence because rehabili-
tation is obviously not served by such a sentence, and incapacitation is a 
particularly unconvincing rationale for permanently confning a juvenile whose 
behavior should change with maturation. But if so, the Court has moved away 
from deference to the felt imperatives of legislatures to incapacitate offenders they 
fear. The Court now seems ready to require that such fears be justifed by empirical 
evidence. Indeed, Graham and Miller do emphasize the importance of providing 
404. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; see also O’Hear, supra note 403, at 3 (“But this distinction is not likely to prove 
durable, because any Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence can be easily recharacterized as a challenge to a 
practice.”). 
405. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding sentence of life without parole for frst time 
offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine). 
406. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
407. See Lee, supra note 142, at 60. Note that the redistributive effects of incarceration create serious problems 
even if the Eighth Amendment includes a retributive “side constraint.” Generally speaking, the fundamental 
attribution error (“FAE”) will lead to excessive prison terms by causing courts and policymakers to overestimate 
an offender’s causal role in provoking violence. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1433 (“If culpability and 
proportionality are likely to be applied badly in a retributive system, these concepts are just as vulnerable to FAE 
when incorporated into utilitarian accounts as side-constraints.”). Further, once we acknowledge that certain 
adverse social settings increase the likelihood of violence, it follows that such adverse situations can bear on 
culpability. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law 
Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten Social Background,” 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 
53, 64 (2011). In other words, someone facing more powerful situational constraints will tend to be less culpable, 
all else equal, than one in a more favorable situation. But because attribution biases cause us to ignore situational 
factors or even blame the unfortunate for their bad luck, people facing adverse situations may be deemed more 
culpable than more fortunate offenders who commit the same crime. This dynamic can create a problematic 
distribution of sentences, arranged by socioeconomic status. While a retributive side constraint tolerates random 
inconsistencies across sentences, it loses much of its normative appeal if it permits systematic unfairness in the 
form of class-based sentencing. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69 (recognizing Eighth Amendment requires 
consideration of background in juvenile offenders); Robinson, supra note 82, at 1442 (suggesting that desert does 
not merely “operate at the extremes of disproportionality” but requires an “ordinal ranking of cases” in which 
those less culpable receive lesser sentences). 
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empirical support that a sentencing practice advances its articulated purpose.408 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller noted the inability of science and 
social science to predict which juvenile offenders are likely to continue offending 
in the future, weakening the state’s incapacitation argument.409 On the other hand, 
she found that neuroimaging and behavior psychology “show fundamental differ-
ences between juvenile and adult minds” such that “[the] actions [of juveniles] are 
less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions 
of adults.”410 In short, the state’s inability to forecast which offenders would 
continue to threaten public safety in the distant future, together with the plaintiff’s 
evidence regarding juvenile brain development, discredited the claim that Gra-
ham’s sentence rationally advanced the goal of incapacitation.411 
Consider how Graham would apply to a practice of sentencing nonviolent 
recidivists who have at least two prior “serious or violent” felonies to life 
imprisonment. Under Graham’s frst prong, California could argue that similar 
recidivist statutes have been enacted in many states, belying a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice.412 But Justice Kennedy explained that statutory 
authorization may be less important than “actual sentencing practices.”413 After 
all, thirty-seven states and the federal government permitted life sentences without 
parole for non-homicide offenses for juveniles in some cases, yet only an 
estimated 129 juvenile offenders in the country were actually serving life sen-
tences without parole, and only ffty-two outside of Florida.414 The Court also 
compared this number with the total number of serious non-homicide offenses 
committed by juveniles, to estimate the very low rate at which such sentences were 
imposed in comparable cases.415 Certainly, a Ewing-like defendant could argue 
that the vast majority of shoplifters do not receive life sentences, even those with 
prior felony convictions. Would it not be “fair to say that a national consensus has 
developed against” such a sentencing practice?416 
A defendant like Ewing would likely satisfy Graham’s second prong. Studies 
show that extremely long sentences have little or no positive incapacitative effect 
408. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–70; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
409. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (reasoning that “[o]ur decisions rest[] not only on common sense—on what 
“any parent knows”—but on science and social science as well”). 
410. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. at 62. 
413. Id. at 62–64. 
414. Id. 
415. Id. at 65–66 (articulating that “[a]lthough it is not certain how many of these numerous juvenile offenders 
were eligible for life without parole sentences, . . . in  proportion to the opportunities for its imposition, life 
without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices 
found to be cruel and unusual”). 
416. Id. at 67 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)). 
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on crime rates,417 whereas alternative crime-control approaches have gained 
considerable traction.418 Given that actuarial predictions have been unable to 
accurately predict violent recidivism, and that a law like California’s does not 
restrict life sentences to offenders who can be shown empirically to pose a risk of 
violence, it would be impossible to justify Ewing’s sentence as serving the purpose 
of incapacitation. The obvious mismatch between Ewing’s culpability and his 
sentence would preclude any judgment that a life sentence was necessary for desert 
or deterrence. Thus, it appears diffcult after Graham and Miller to justify 
imposing a life sentence on our hypothetical shoplifter. Nor would the Court have 
to explicitly overrule Ewing, since Ewing did not frame his challenge as a 
challenge to a sentencing practice, and offered no evidence showing the ineffective-
ness of California’s three-strike law in selecting the demonstrably dangerous or 
reducing crime.419 
Perhaps Miller should be read to indicate that extremely long sentences, which 
are analogous to death in that they are effectively life-destroying, may be imposed 
for the sole purpose of incapacitation only after an individualized assessment of 
incorrigibility is made.420 Since these life-ending sentences may violate desert, 
while very few people are truly incorrigible, the state should be expected to 
produce objective evidence of incorrigibility. When a state rests a sentence entirely 
on a speculative prediction about an offender’s incapacity for change, it arguably 
imposes a sentence that, “lacking any legitimate penological justifcation[,] is by 
its nature disproportionate.”421 
Moreover, there is something nonsensical about trying to justify lifelong 
confnement on the basis of incapacitation. Incapacitation arguably implies an 
exigent threat, not a threat that may or may not exist sometime in the future. The 
Court hints at this point in Graham: “Here one cannot dispute that this defendant 
posed an immediate risk . . . but it does not follow that he would be a risk to society 
for the rest of his life.”422 Treating confnement for life as necessary on grounds of 
417. See BRIAN BROWN & GREG JOLIVETTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A  PRIMER: THREE STRIKES—THE 
IMPACT AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE 33 (2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.pdf 
(fnding no clear effect of the three-strikes law on public safety). 
418. See, e.g., Alexandra Galassi et al., Therapeutic Community Treatment of an Inmate Population with 
Substance Use Disorders: Post-Release Trends in Re-Arrest, Re-Incarceration, and Drug Misuse Relapse 12 
INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 7059 (2015); Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to 
Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 
295 (2009) (“A variety of research demonstrates that investments in drug treatment, interventions with at-risk 
families, and school completion programs are more cost-effective than expanded incarceration as crime control 
measures.”). 
419. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978) (2002 WL 
31120962) (arguing that “[t]he effectiveness of a state’s sentencing policy . . . is  irrelevant for Eighth Amendment 
purposes”); see O’Hear, supra note 141. 
420. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012). 
421. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. 
422. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
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incapacitation requires a view of the defendant’s behavior as entirely determined 
by a permanently fxed disposition. This assumption is necessary only if incapaci-
tation cannot call for periodic reevaluations of offender dangerousness.423 Prior to 
the emergence of mass incarceration, offender dangerousness was periodically 
assessed by parole boards, which viewed incapacitation as the inverse of rehabili-
tation.424 The notion that determinate sentences are necessary for incapacitation 
refects an ideological rejection of rehabilitation that changes the meaning of 
incapacitation from an empirically sensitive placement aimed at affecting conse-
quences, to an expressively motivated attribution of depravity, aimed at distinguish-
ing and excluding offenders from society. 
Miller’s dissenters would reduce incapacitation to an inherent consequence of 
imprisonment, which presumes that offenders would recidivate if unconfned, and 
that crimes against inmates do not matter.425 This superfcial account of incapacita-
tion would render proportionality a “nullity,” since all incarceration incapacitates 
in that limited sense of the word.426 As a utilitarian justifcation for punishment, 
however, incapacitation is satisfed not by simply confning an offender, but by the 
more complicated task of making the world less violent. To meaningfully assess 
incapacitation in this way requires considering the impact of a sentencing practice 
on “an entire class of offenders.”427 Graham’s distinction between categorical and 
individual challenges, while elusive, allows us to test incapacitation as a penologi-
cal theory by asking more broadly whether a sentencing practice, applied to a 
particular group of offenders, would actually achieve a net decrease in violent 
crime. That is something Florida and Alabama did not do. To that end, Graham and 
Miller suggest the Court is no longer willing to consign defendants to life-
destroying sentences on the basis of guesswork.428 The next state to defend a 
sentencing practice on grounds of incapacitation will likely need to produce some 
empirical evidence that imposing long sentences on a particular class of offenders 
actually reduces violent crime overall. 
Finally, Graham and Miller refect a new appreciation for situational constraints 
on behavior. Courts must reckon with the moral signifcance of “environmental 
vulnerabilities” that shape the lives of juvenile offenders.429 Under Miller, states 
are constitutionally required to distinguish between “the child from a stable 
423. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1446 (“[I]f the justifcation for detention is dangerousness, then logically 
the government ought to be required periodically to prove the detainee’s continuing dangerousness. If the 
dangerousness disappears, so does the justifcation for detention.”). 
424. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole 
Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 498–501 (2008). 
425. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (“If imprisonment does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the 
general population and prevents him from committing additional crimes in the outside world.”). 
426. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. 
427. See id. at 61. 
428. O’Hear, supra note 141, at 1105. 
429. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
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household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one” in imposing life-
destroying sentences.430 If Graham and Miller are to be taken seriously, courts and 
policymakers may not deliver juvenile offenders into permanent exile without 
considering the social context in which they committed their crimes. Extending the 
same standard of decency to adult offenders is the next frontier of Eighth 
Amendment sentencing proportionality. 
CONCLUSION 
Incapacitation of offenders has been an infuential goal of criminal justice policy 
during the era of mass incarceration. While the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has accepted incapacitation alone as a justifying purpose for 
recidivist sentencing enhancements, recent decisions have judged severe sentences 
by reference to all purposes of punishment cumulatively, and have tested claims of 
incapacitative benefts against empirical evidence. This Article has criticized 
incapacitation theory as both theoretically and empirically fawed. We have seen 
that incapacitation theory greatly underestimates situational factors contributing to 
crime and over-attributes dangerousness to individuals. It also systematically 
ignores crime committed in prison, implying that offenders deserve to be victim-
ized. By assuming that criminality inheres in individual character, incapacitation 
theory attributes blame to individuals for situational causes of misfortune. These 
faws preclude incapacitation from rationally justifying lengthy recidivist sentence 
enhancements as preventive, and suggest that such sentences cannot meet the more 
demanding proportionality standard applied in recent Eighth Amendment cases. 
430. Id. at 2467–68. 
